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The Thoughtful Integration
of Mediation into Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitrationi
Nancy A. Welsh2 and Andrea Kupfer Schneidera
ABSTRACT
While the current system of investment treaty arbitration has
definitely improved upon the "gunboat diplomacy" used at times
to address disputes between states and foreign investors, there
are signs that reform is needed: states and investors increas-
ingly express concerns regarding the costs associated with the
arbitration process, some states refuse to comply with arbitral
awards, other states hesitate to sign new bilateral investment
treaties, and citizens have begun to engage in popular unrest at
the prospect of investment treaty arbitration. As a result, both
investors and states are advocating for the use of mediation to
supplement investor-state arbitration. This Article draws upon
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dispute system design principles, the socio-psychological re-
search and theories regarding procedural justice, and the U.S.
experience with court-connected mediation. Using these lens,
the article examines the models of mediation that have been
shown to be effective, the importance of ensuring that mediation
offers something different from the other procedural options
available to resolve investor-state disputes, and the mecha-
nisms that increase the likelihood that disputing parties and
stakeholders will perceive individual outcomes and the larger
system as fair. The Article also examines the U.S. domestic ex-
perience to identify the elements of the mediation process that
can be, and have been, made compulsory and the effects of this
choice, as well as different approaches for ensuring the quality
of the mediation process and its accountability to the disputing
parties and other stakeholders. Ultimately, the Article recom-
mends the integration of a default model of mediation into the
investor-state context that begins in a facilitative manner, in or-
der to increase the likelihood of trust-building and information
exchange regarding important underlying interests, but also
permits both evaluative interventions by the mediator and dis-
cussion of relevant legal norms. The Article further concludes
that if stakeholders' input is sought and considered regarding
mechanisms for the referral of disputes to mediation, some ele-
ments of mediation could be made compulsory. More specifi-
cally, the dispute resolution clauses in investment treaties could
require the parties to participate in an initial meeting to discuss
the potential use of mediation or other consensual procedures,
with the parties themselves then choosing whether to proceed
further, when, and with what process. Finally, the Article rec-
ommends the establishment of a small pool of well-known and
well-respected investment treaty mediators who will offer a rea-
sonably strong and pragmatic guarantee of quality in the short-
term and engender a heightened perception of trust in the pro-
cess. These mediators should also possess the temperament and
skills to provide the default model of mediation. In the long
term, however, evaluation and mentoring must be put into place
to permit thoughtful cultivation of both the model of mediation
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I. INTRODUCTION
Investment treaty arbitration has evolved over time to encourage
and protect foreign investment. Historically, companies that in-
vested money in foreign countries hoped that their governments
would step in and protect them if the host government did not treat
them well. In some instances, this "gunboat diplomacy" not only pro-
tected investment but also resulted in violent confrontation. As part
of the effort to move away from such power-based relations among
states and toward cooperation within international organizations,
member governments of the World Bank ratified the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States in 1965 and established the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").4 While the
multiple attempts since then to create a multilateral treaty to govern
international investment have resulted in failure, the bilateral in-
vestment treaty ("BIT") model has thrived.5
Patterned after friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties
(FCNs), BITs were originally designed to provide for the protection of
foreign investment in each country and for treatment that is no dif-
ferent from that experienced by host country investors.6 BITs also
now provide for arbitration under the rules of ICSID or the United
Nations Commission for International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). 7
Arbitration proponents urge that arbitration has played a significant
role in easing global commerce by: (1) enabling states and investors
4. See INT'L CTR. FOR SETrLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGU-
LATIONS AND RULES 5, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/
basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf; Andrea K. Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution
of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH J. INT'L
L. 697, 714-19 (outlining a description of the investor arbitration regime).
5. Estimates are that over 3000 BITs were signed between 1959 and 2009. Jes-
wald Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427,
429 (2010).
6. Here, we are referencing the history and intent of BITs, not more recent juris-
prudence in which the argument has been made that foreign investors actually are
treated better than domestic investors, due to the right of recourse made available by
BITs.
7. See U. N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PRE-
VENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11,
U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010) available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
diaeia200911_en.pdf [hereinafter INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES],; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata,
Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and
MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. 1, n. 1 (1986), cited in Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the
Resolution of Investor-State Disputes - Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leader-
ship, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1345, n. 32 (2006) [hereinafter Transparency].
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to resolve disputes and maintain relationships; (2) providing appro-
priate remedies to harmed investors; and (3) attracting foreign in-
vestment to those states that adhere to the investment treaty
regime.8 Sometimes, these positive effects have been direct, as evi-
denced by the issuance of arbitral awards followed by parties' peace-
ful compliance. More frequently, arbitration's effects have been
indirect, with states and investors communicating and negotiating
toward resolution in order to achieve shared interests and at the
same time avoid the arbitral forum.9 As W. Michael Reisman has
observed recently, only a "miniscule fraction of the universe of foreign
direct investment"10 finds its way to investment treaty arbitration.
Nonetheless, the process can cast a long shadow."
8. See INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 7 at 3 ("Host states wishing to at-
tract and promote foreign investment often seek to offer predictability to foreign in-
vestors by favouring international arbitration as the means for investors to deal with
a dispute."). But see U. N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES, xi, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No.
E.09.II.D.20 (2009) ("IIAs are part of the policy framework for foreign investment...
HAs alone can never be a sufficient policy instrument to attract FDI [foreign direct
investment]"), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20095_en.pdf; Jason
Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some
Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 438 (2011) (reporting research
suggesting that a nation's entry into a BIT does not tend to influence companies' deci-
sions to invest); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer L. Tobin, Do BITs Benefit Develop-
ing Countries?, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 134-36 (Catherine A.
Rogers & Roger P. Alford, eds., 2009) (concluding that countries with poor investment
environments do not benefit significantly from entering into BITs); Susan D. Franck,
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1, 13-23 (2007) (surveying empirical research regarding investment arbitration).
9. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Inves-
tor-State Disputes-A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 35
(2005) [hereinafter Complementary Use] (estimating that 30% of all arbitral filings
are resolved by settlement); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There A Better Way? Alternative
Methods of Treaty Based Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
138, 168 (2007) (describing how "initiation of an arbitration may both favor and dis-
courage negotiated settlements"); INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, THE
ICSID CASELOAD STATISTICS 13 (2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
Index.jsp (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "ICSID Publications" hyper-
link; then follow "The ICSID Caseload - Statistics" hyperlink; then choose from "Issue
2011-1") (indicating that 39% of ICSID's arbitration and conciliation proceedings that
concluded in the first half of 2011 were settled or otherwise discontinued).
10. See W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR:
Married but Best Living Apart, in INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES II, supra note 1, at 22-27.
11. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); see also Salacuse, supra note 9,
at 157 (adopting definition of ADR as "alternatives to both international arbitration
and adjudication in domestic courts"); see also Andrea K. Schneider, Bargaining in the
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Within the last decade, however, there has been a noticeable
surge in the number of investors accessing investment treaty arbitra-
tion. 12 Perhaps as a result of this phenomenon, 13 coupled with the
heavy costs of investment treaty arbitration 14 and the magnitude of
some arbitral awards, both states and investors are now raising mul-
tiple concerns. They decry the expense, delays, and political chal-
lenges associated with relying exclusively on a rights-based arbitral
process and its outcomes.' 5 The current investment arbitration sys-
tem relies on states' voluntary compliance with arbitral awards, espe-
cially when they are adverse. Some states, however, have threatened
to refuse to abide by arbitral awards, others have acted on such
threats, and still others have chosen to withdraw from BITs.' 6 In a
few states, popular resistance to the prospect of investor-state
arbitration has manifested in rioting.' 7 Such opposition and the
implementation of threats of non-compliance have the potential to
Shadow of (International) Law: What the Normalization of Adjudication in Interna-
tional Governance Regimes Means for Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
789 (2009).
12. See INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 9; Salacuse,
supra note 9, at 143-47.
13. Significant surges in other contexts have led to similar perceptions of crisis
and the need for change. See e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (1996) (noting that surge in asbestos cases may
have contributed to a sense that courts were overburdened); Scott Sigmund Gartner
& Gary M. Segura, War, Casualties, and Public Opinion, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 278,
296-99 (1998) (observing that sudden surges in key indicators-e.g., war deaths-
cause change in institutional strategies).
14. See Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 782-90 (2011) (reporting regarding the costs of investment
treaty arbitration); Catherine Rogers, The Arrival of the "Have-Nots" in International
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L. J. 341, 357 (2007) (observing that while foreign investors have
typically hired major international law firms to represent them in investor-state arbi-
tration, many developing countries have not, due to the expense associated with such
representation or for political reasons).
15. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 29 (2010); JAMES M GAITIS, COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS GUIDE
TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2-5 (2d ed. 2010); Salacuse, supra
note 9.
16. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 15-16; Franck, supra note 8, at
64-65. See also Issues Note, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims,
U.N. Issues Note No. 2, at 4-5 (Dec. 2010) (describing withdrawal of Bolivia and Ecua-
dor from ICSID and Ecuador's termination of several bilateral investment treaties),
available at http://www.unctad.orglen/docs/webdiaeia20lO6_en.pdf; Ignacio A.
Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID In Latin America, 16 LAW. & Bus. REV.
AM. 409 (2010) (reviewing the growing resistance in Latin American to ICSID).
17. Ben Lewis, Arbitration Targeted in Final Fight Over Korea FTA Passage, THE
ASIAN LAWYER (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticle-
Intl.jsp?id=1202532852271&slreturn=1. The strength of this opposition is particu-
larly noteworthy in light of empirical research showing that investment arbitral
[Vol. 18:71
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inject substantial uncertainty into the current system of interna-
tional investment and trade, especially if the international commu-
nity fails to find some means to buttress the legitimacy of investment
treaty arbitration and its awards.' 8 Integrating mediation into the
process choices offered by the current system represents one impor-
tant response that could and should be made by the international
community.
Mediation represents an attractive option in this context for
several reasons. First and most obviously, the process provides
investors and states with the potential to resolve their disputes them-
selves-more quickly than arbitration, less expensively than arbitra-
tion, and in a manner designed to preserve a valuable business
relationship. Indeed, mediation even has the potential to improve
the business relationship if investors and states use the process to
share important information, including their most important needs
or interests, and take advantage of the opportunity to build trust in
each other, or at least reduce distrust. Finally, mediation offers the
opportunity to include other parties, who may not have standing to
participate in the arbitration process, but whose participation may
expand available resources and assist with the implementation of
any agreements that are reached.
This Article begins with a brief description of some of the
problems that have arisen in the current investment treaty system,
using the experience in Argentina as an example. The Article turns
next to mediation and the concerns that have been raised regarding
its potential integration into the investor-state context. Responding
to these concerns requires consideration of dispute system design
principles, research regarding the antecedents and influence of per-
ceptions of procedural justice, and theories explaining such influence.
The Article therefore goes into some detail regarding dispute system
tribunals have not tended to favor one side over the other. See Tai Heng Cheng, Inter-
national Mediation, Arbitration and Innovation, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FoRDHAM PAPERS 2010 434, 438 (Arthur
W. Rovine ed., 2010) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2010] (citing Susan D.
Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 435, 439 (2009)).
18. See, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM xIv-xv, 3-4 (1997) (regarding non-compliance with arbitral awards arising out
of the GATT and subsequent replacement with WTO system). Threats of non-compli-
ance certainly are not new, or even unique to international arbitration. In the U.S.,
the famous case of Marbury v. Madison involved a freshly-minted Supreme Court
similarly struggling to establish its legal and political authority while also acknowl-
edging its dependence on the enforcement power wielded by the executive branch of
government. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Spring 20131
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design and procedural justice. The Article then turns to the relation-
ship between mediation, on one hand, and the processes of arbitra-
tion, conciliation, and preventative procedures adopted by some
states, on the other hand. This examination requires consideration of
the different models of mediation and their advantages and disad-
vantages. The Article then reports on the variety of compulsory re-
ferral schemes that have been tested in the U.S. and elsewhere and
finally touches briefly on the importance and variety of available
quality control measures and the development of a pool of investor-
state mediators.
Ultimately, and based on dispute system design principles and
procedural justice research and theories, this Article will recommend
the integration of a "default" model of mediation into the investor-
state context. This model begins in a facilitative manner, in order to
increase the likelihood of trust-building and information exchange,
but also permits evaluative interventions and the use of legal norms.
The Article further concludes that if stakeholders' input is sought
and considered regarding mechanisms for the referral of disputes to
mediation, some elements of mediation could be made compulsory.
Particularly, dispute resolution clauses in investment treaties could
require the parties' participation in an initial meeting, or even an ini-
tial mediation session, with the parties themselves then choosing
whether to proceed further in mediation at that time or to specify the
timing of its future use. Finally, the Article recommends the estab-
lishment of a small pool of well-known and well-respected investment
treaty mediators who will offer a reasonably strong and pragmatic
guarantee of quality in the short-term and engender a heightened
perception of trust in the process. These mediators should also pos-
sess the temperament and skills to provide the default model of medi-
ation. In the long term, evaluation and mentoring must be put into
place to permit thoughtful cultivation of both the model of mediation
that is best suited for the investor-state context and the next genera-
tion of mediators.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
AND CONCERNS ABOUT MEDIATION
A. The Emergence of Problems in Investor-State Arbitration
Despite the notable successes of investment treaty arbitration,
described supra, investors and states are now raising multiple con-
cerns. Of course, the significant costs of the process and the magni-
tude of some of the awards explain many of these concerns. But the
current arbitration process also tends to focus parties on the law and
their legal rights-and the need to resolve ambiguities regarding
[Vol. 18:7 1
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration
such legal rights' 9-when the parties' extra-legal interests may be
both equally important and sufficient to achieve a meaningful, last-
ing resolution.20 Indeed, some commentators fear that the win-lose
nature of the arbitration process itself may serve to marginalize some
parties' uniquely cooperative socio-cultural characteristics and in-
hibit them from identifying the mutual interests that have the poten-
tial to keep a troubled business relationship from becoming
irreparably broken. As Jeswald Salacuse notes, "[n]either the aim
nor the consequence of arbitration is to repair a broken business rela-
tionship."21 Particularly noteworthy have been the comments made
by Grant Kesler, the Chief Executive Officer of Metalclad, after his
company won a 17-million-dollar arbitral award against Mexico. In
retrospect, and despite being victorious, Kesler said that arbitration
had been so dissatisfying that he wished his company had relied upon
its "political options" to resolve the dispute. 22 Gabriel Bottini, who
leads the International Affairs Department in the Solicitor-General's
Office for Argentina, has similarly cited his own experience to opine
that "at least for some" of the investors involved in disputes with Ar-
gentina, "conciliation could have been a valuable alternative to pur-
sue the resolution of these claims. '23 These comments suggest that
19. See Mark A. Clodfelter, Why Aren't More Investor-State Treaty Disputes Set-
tled Amicably?, in INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES II, supra note 1, at 38-42 (citing to legal
questions regarding the arbitrability of disputes arising under most-favored-nation
clauses, the types of activities that qualify as investments, and the elements of claims
for violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard or the national treatment
standard).
20. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay
Rights and Religious Liberty, 95 IowA L. REV. 747 (2010) (suggesting that mediation
is most appropriate to craft customized implementation of judicially-determined legal
entitlements).
21. Salacuse, supra note 9, at 155.
22. See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute
Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 224 n. 266 (2007) (citing Coe, Complementary
Use, supra note 9, at 8-9); Salacuse, supra note 9, at 147; see also Jack J. Coe, Jr.,
Should Mediation of Investment Disputes Be Encouraged, and, if so, by Whom and
How?, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE
FORDHAM PAPERS 2009, at 339, 339-40 [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2009] (ob-
serving that Metalclad received $7 million less than it sought and found its hopes of
building upon its relationship with Mexico dashed).
23. Gabriel Bottini & Veronica Lavista, Conciliation and BITs, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES 2009, supra note 22 at 359, 365 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2009). But see Peter
M. Wolrich, Resolution of Disputes by ICC Dispute Boards, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
2010, supra note 17, at 475 (describing the differences among the ICC's Dispute Re-
view Boards, Dispute Adjudication Boards and Combined Board, and observing that
debtors tend to prefer the review process-which allows them to retain control of the
monies in dispute unless they are persuaded to pay the creditor-while creditors tend
Spring 20131
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losing parties, and even some of those who have won, may not per-
ceive arbitration as providing them with a sufficient opportunity to
come to their own less public but more customized, satisfying and
final resolutions.
The series of cases arising out of Argentina's debt crisis early in
this century provide concrete examples of arbitration's potential dis-
advantages. 24 In the early1990s, many foreign corporations invested
in Argentinian companies as Argentina promoted privatization. As
part of these investments, Argentina agreed to stabilize the peso
against the dollar by collecting tariffs in dollars and readjusting the
tariff rate twice a year. (U.S. investors benefitted economically from
this assurance of a stable tariff.) Ten years later, during the Argen-
tinian debt crisis, the government of Argentina passed an emergency
law suspending both the favorable conversion ratio and the semi-an-
nual adjustments. (Because these stabilization programs had only
applied to foreign investors, the suspension disadvantaged only the
foreign investors.) When foreign companies brought arbitration
cases under the BIT, claiming that foreign investors had been denied
fair and equitable treatment, Argentina argued the necessity defense
under customary international law and the relevant BIT's emergency
clauses.
One such arbitration involved CMS Energy, an American corpo-
ration that owned 30% of TGN, an Argentinean gas transportation
company. As part of CMS's original investment, the government of
Argentina agreed to the favorable conversion ratio and semi-annual
adjustments described supra.25 At arbitration, CMS won an award of
$133 million against Argentina in 2005.26 Argentina moved to annul
the award, and CMS won again in 2007 before the annulment com-
mittee. 27 The annulment committee, however, so criticized the legal
to prefer the adjudicative process-which may result in the debtor being forced to pay
the creditor).
24. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Error Correction and Dispute System Design in
Investor-State Arbitration, 5 PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION (forthcoming 2013)
(describing the series of cases in greater detail). See also Irene Ten Cate, Interna-
tional Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1109, 1174 (2012). See also David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International
Investment Arbitration: Seeking An Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 383 (2010).
25. See Cate, supra note 24.
26. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/0118,
Award, 468 (May 12, 2005) https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC504_En&caseId=C4.
27. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Annulment Decision, 159, 163 (Sept 25, 2007) https://icsid.worldbank.orgICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC505_En&case
[Vol. 18:71
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basis for the original arbitral award that Argentina likely perceived
itself as quite justified in not paying.28 Today, seven years after the
original award, CMS has yet to receive payment from Argentina.
Rather, CMS has transferred the debt to a subsidiary of Bank of
America that specializes in distressed debt, to permit CMS to con-
tinue to invest in Argentina. 29 Other significant awards against Ar-
gentina also remain unpaid. The award won by the U.S. company
Azurix, for example, amounts to more than $165 million.
30
Argentina has successfully used the annulment process in other
cases, however. Both the Sempra and Enron arbitral tribunals, for
example, used reasoning similar to that of the original CMS tribunal,
to find for the investor-claimants and against Argentina. 31 When
Argentina moved to annul these awards, however, it was success-
ful. 32 Argentina has also achieved partial annulments to reduce arbi-
tral awards and has settled other cases before they have gone to an
arbitration hearing.
33
Id=C4. Under ICSID, foreign investors file a request for arbitration with the Secre-
tary-General of ICSID. ICSID art. 36. Cases proceed to arbitration under ICSID
rules heard by an arbitral tribunal. If a dispute arises as to the award, parties can
request an annulment of the award. This annulment committee is constituted, also
by the Secretary-General of ICSID, of three new arbitrators to review the award. IC-
SID art. 52. The selection of annulment committee members and the annulment com-
mittee process is worthy of additional academic study but is beyond the scope of this
article.
28. See David Caron, Framing the Work of ICSID Annulment Committees, 6
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 173 (2012), available at http://works.bepress.com/
davidcaron/134/ (quoting Jose Alvarez in fn 18).
29. Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Inves-
tors Still Wait for a Payout, LAw.COM, June 25, 2009, http://www.law.comjsp/article.
jsp?id=120243173673 1&Argentine CrisisArbitrationAwards_Pile_UpbutInvest
orsStillWait for a Payout (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
30. Azurix v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Annulment Deci-
sion, $1 37 (Sept. 1, 2009) https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1171_En&caseId=C5. (upholding the ar-
bitral award).
31. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award, 482(Sept. 28, 2007) http://italaw.com/documents/SempraAward.pdf; Enron
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 91 261 (May 22, 2007),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf.
32. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case NO. ARB/02/16, An-
nulment Decision, 223 (June 29, 2010) https://icsid.worldbank.orgfICSID/FrontSer-
vlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1550_En&cased=C8 ;
Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Annulment Decision,
$[ 406-17 (July 30, 2010) http://italaw.com/documentsfEnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf.
See Schneider, supra note 24, for more on the comparisons between the legal reason-
ing of the contradictory annulment committees decisions and the impact of this
inconsistency.
33. See Lucy Reed, Scorecard of Investment Treaty Cases Against Argentina
Since 2001, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, Mar. 2, 2009, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.
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In all of these cases, Argentina has claimed that its actions were
the result of necessary economic policy decisions. Some companies,
like CMS, have moved on and written off whatever they might have
collected from the arbitration awards. Other companies have negoti-
ated settlements with Argentina. Still others, however, continue to
fight and have involved the U.S. government, which has now sus-
pended Argentina from general preferential trade treaties. 34 Both
the lack of resolution for individual companies and worsening eco-
nomic relationships between governments are exactly the sorts of
problems that the arbitration system was designed to avoid.
B. Adding Mediation to the Mix
Responding to these concerns, Professors Jack Coe,35 Jeswald
Salacuse, 36 and Susan Franck37 have urged consideration of proce-
dures and systems that actually could prevent the development of in-
vestor-state disputes. They have also recommended early and
greater use of consensual procedures such as conciliation, early neu-
tral evaluation, ombudspersons, and mediation. Some states have
begun to put preventative procedures into place. 38 These will be de-
scribed in greater detail infra. Investors, states, and interested inter-
national bodies and scholars have also begun to focus quite
specifically on mediation. 39
As noted supra, mediation is attractive because it provides inves-
tors and states with the potential to resolve their disputes them-
selves-more quickly than arbitration, less expensively than
arbitration, and in a manner designed to preserve a valuable busi-
ness relationship. The process also has the potential to encourage
investors and states to develop trust in each other (or at least reduce
distrust) and share important information, including their most im-
portant needs or interests that must be met in order to arrive at a
resolution. Mediation's flexibility also offers the opportunity to
com/blog/2009/03/02/scorecard-of-investment-treaty-cases-against-argentina-since-
2001/, (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
34. Tom Barkley & Ken Parks, U. S. Cuts Trade Preferences to Argentina, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023041771045773
05652479085184.html (March 26, 2012).
35. See Coe, Complementary Use, supra note 9; see also Coe, supra note 22.
36. See Salacuse, supra note 9.
37. See Franck, supra note 14.
38. See infra Section III(a).
39. See, e.g., INVESTOR-STATE DIsPuTEs II, supra note 1; IBA Rules For Investor-
State Mediation Int'l Bar Ass'n, Mediation Comm., State Mediation Subcomm., (Oct.
4, 2012) [hereinafter IBA Rules].
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include other parties, who may not have standing to participate in
the arbitration process, but whose participation may expand availa-
ble resources and assist with the implementation of any agreements
reached by the parties. Finally, the mediator can help both the state
and the investor to be realistic about their options, thus making it
more likely that the parties will arrive at a solution they can, and
will, implement.
The International Bar Association ("IBA") very recently ap-
proved rules to facilitate the use of investor-state mediation (IBA
Rules for Investor-State Mediation or "IBA Rules").40 This action by
the IBA represents an extremely important first step toward legiti-
mizing investor-state mediation. At the same time, the rules are un-
likely to go far enough to motivate significant integration of
mediation into the fabric of the investment treaty context.
First, the IBA Rules provide only for voluntary mediation, begin-
ning with a mediation management conference which occurs only af-
ter the parties have elected mediation and designated the mediator.41
As outlined infra in this Article, some form of compulsion may be
needed, at least provisionally, to encourage parties to overcome cur-
rent obstacles to the use of mediation.4 2 As this Article will explain,
such compulsion need not be terribly intrusive. For example, invest-
ment treaties' dispute resolution clauses could require the signatory
states' and investors' participation in an initial meeting to discuss the
40. Id.
41. Interestingly, the Rules provide that "[bly agreeing to mediate under these
rules, a party undertakes to participate in the mediation management conference."
Id. at art. 9.4. Participation in the mediation management conference apparently
represents the extent of a party's commitment: "A party may withdraw from the me-
diation at any time after the mediation management conference. Prior to withdraw-
ing from the mediation, a party must notify the other party or parties and the
mediator of its intention to withdraw, preferably stating its reasons. Prior to a party's
withdrawal from the mediation, the mediator shall hold a meeting with all parties in
person, by telephone or by any other means of telecommunication." Id.
42. Some academics and stakeholders have responded with interest to sugges-
tions that mediation should not just be encouraged, but made compulsory. See Lisa
Blomgren Bingham, Opportunities for Dispute Systems Design in INVESTMENT TREATY
DispuTEs: Consensual Dispute Resolution at Varying Levels, in INVESTOR-STATE Dis-
PuTEs II, supra note 1, at 33 (observing that the conference included discussion of
mandatory mediation, but with an opt-out); Wolf von Kumberg, Making Mediation
Mainstream: An Application for Investment Treaty Disputes, in INVESTOR-STATE Dis-
PUTES II, supra note 1, at 71 (proposing inclusion of mediation in a multi-step dispute
resolution clause in BITs). But see Margrete Stevens, Synopsis of Remarks, in INVEs-
TOR-STATE DispuTEs II, supra note 1, at 28 (not supportive of compulsory mediation);
Lucy Reed, Synopsis of Closing Remarks, in INVESTOR-STATE DIsPUTES II, supra note
1, at 30 (not supportive of compulsory mediation).
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potential use of mediation or other consensual procedures, before or
soon after the initiation of arbitration proceedings.
Second, the IBA Rules are silent regarding the "default" model of
mediation that should be used to achieve the goals that motivated
states to enter into BITs. The IBA Rules provide only that "[i]n con-
ducting the mediation ... the mediator shall take into account the
wishes of the parties. . .,43 Such failure to identify the "default"
model of mediation makes it difficult to know what "mediation" is and
how to differentiate the process from other available options, such as
conciliation. If there is no such differentiation, it is unclear why me-
diation is needed.
Finally, the IBA Rules may not be clear enough in providing that
justice-particularly procedural justice-represents a central goal of
the mediation process. The Rules provide that the mediator "shall be
guided" by several principles, including the principle of "fairness,"
but later provide that in managing the process, the mediator "shall
take into account" the parties' wishes, "the circumstances of the case
and the overall goal of a cost-efficient and timely settlement of the dif-
ferences or disputes."44 In failing to re-assert the role of procedural
justice here, the IBA Rules could inadvertently undermine the legiti-
macy of mediation and its outcomes.
Despite all of the concerns just raised, the IBA Rules definitely
demonstrate the existence of an appetite for mediation as a new pro-
cess choice and the commitment of stakeholders to move forward
with its integration.
C. Critiques of Mediation-and the Challenges to be Met
Not all stakeholders, however, have been so ready to embrace ex-
panded use of mediation. First, some have criticized the mediation
process as, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, a threat to the useful
work being done by arbitration.45 Negotiation and conciliation
43. IBA Rules, supra note 39, at art. 7; see also id. at art. 8 (providing that "[tihe
mediation shall be conducted in accordance with the parties' wishes . . . ").
44. Id. at 5 (emphasis added); Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Court-Connected
General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution,
and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 1, 2 (Donna Stienstra &
Susan Yates eds., 2004) (emphasizing the importance of defining the goals of estab-
lishing a court-connected ADR program and providing guidance regarding all aspects
of implementing such a program).
45. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 10; see generally Coe, Complementary Use,
supra note 9, at 17-18 (describing the weaknesses of conciliation that arise out of its
dependence upon the parties' voluntary and good faith use of the process).
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already provide diplomatic options for investors and states, and con-
ciliation is rarely used. Given the current fragility of the investment
arbitration system, adding a new process could be destabilizing.
Other commentators have observed, meanwhile, that mediation and
conciliation are largely interchangeable, 46 which suggests that the
introduction of mediation will not produce any more resolution than
currently results from negotiation and conciliation. These points re-
call debates that occurred in the U.S. a couple of decades ago, when
mediation proponents first urged the integration of mediation into
civil litigation.
47
These points also reveal the importance of identifying a "default"
model of mediation that is meaningfully different from the existing
processes of parties' negotiations and conciliation. Further, they sug-
gest the need to incorporate some compulsory elements, identify a
pool of mediators who have the credibility, trustworthiness, knowl-
edge, experience and skills that the parties do not already possess,
and provide a means to assure the continued quality of those
mediators providing investor-state mediation.
48
46. But see Salacuse, supra note 9, at 166 (estimates of negotiated settlements in
ICSID run as high as 30%); See Coe, Complementary Use, supra note 9, at 14.
47. Some judges and litigators resisted that call, confusing "mediation" with
"meditation" and therapy, labeling mediation a "fad," and insisting that mediation
would represent an unprincipled, emotion-driven process. Some of these criticisms
persist. See e.g., THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CARBONNEAU'S ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL,
3rd ed. 362-368 (2012) (describing mediation as a "'talking therapy' model of dispute
resolution" that is most appropriate for the resolution of child custody disputes, "elit-
ist and paternalistic at its foundation" and "built upon fallacious and incomplete
thinking"). Interestingly, such critics have been joined by others who now suggest
that mediation represents nothing more than the unprincipled bargaining of the mar-
ketplace. See e.g., Kakani v. Oracle Corp., 2007 WL 1793774, 154 Lab. Cas. P 35,310
(N.D.Cal., June 19, 2007) ("It is also no answer to say that a private mediator helped
frame the proposal. Such a mediator is paid to help the immediate parties reach a
deal. Mediators do not adjudicate the merits. They are masters in the art of what is
negotiable. It matters little to the mediator whether a deal is collusive as long as a
deal is reached. Such a mediator has no fiduciary duty to anyone, much less those not
at the table. Plaintiffs' counsel has the fiduciary duty. It cannot be delegated to a
private mediator.").
48. A further difficulty involves conflicting cultural assumptions regarding par-
ties' ability to listen and change in response to changing circumstances. See Michael
W. Morris & Michele J. Gelfand, Cultural Differences and Cognitive Dynamics: Ex-
panding the Cognitive Perspective on Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION
AND CULTURE 45, 52-53 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004) (describing
cultural variability in dispositionist bias or fundamental attribution theory, with East
Asians being more likely than North Americans to perceive an individual's behavior
as situationally-contingent and influenced by the group); Philip McConnaughay, Re-
thinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West Commercial Relationships, 41
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Second, some commentators argue that the entire legal regime
would have to be restructured if mediation were added. Hundreds of
BITs would require renegotiation and the rules and procedures of IC-
SID and other bodies would need to be revised. Such renegotiation
and revision 49 has the potential to be both time-consuming and
wasteful, especially if parties can easily avoid the mediation process
or participate in a manner that makes resolution unlikely. Once
again, this objection reveals the importance of designing the media-
tion process, and the mechanisms to support its use, in a manner that
makes good faith participation and resolution more likely and also
saves costs, time and investor-state relationships, in both the short
term and the long term. This is a primary reason for this Article-to
plumb past experience with the institutionalization of compulsory
mediation, as well as dispute system design and procedural justice
research and theories, to suggest means that will make it more likely
that investor-state mediation achieves its goals.
A third critique of mediation in the investor-state context is
based on the unique difficulties that arise in disputes that involve a
sovereign state. Some commentators worry that mediation, espe-
cially if it includes compulsory elements, cannot possibly be exported
from the private commercial context into the investment treaty con-
text. These commentators argue that in international commercial
mediation, private parties can participate more openly and enter into
"deals" more quickly because they do not need to grapple with na-
tional security issues, economic policy issues, and the prospect of do-
mestic political accountability. 50 While a state can frame an adverse
arbitral award as an unfortunate loss that nonetheless requires ad-
herence due to treaty obligations, 51 the state's voluntary settlement
that acknowledges the commission of a wrong and payment of a sub-
stantial sum to the investor has the potential to be a much harder
VA. J. INT'L L. 427, 428-40 (2000-2001) (contrasting Western and Eastern understand-
ings of contract obligations). This much larger issue will not be addressed in this
Article.
49. Coe, supra note 22, at 350-52 (discussing the necessary revised treaty
language).
50. See Reed, supra note 42, at 30-32.
51. See Salacuse, supra note 9, at 168. In particular, note the story of the Egyp-
tian Pyramids case in which the president himself turned down a settlement offer
because of political pressures. Even though the offer to settle-for $10 million-
would have made economic sense for the government of Egypt, the president knew
that press coverage of the settlement would sharply criticize the government. Press
coverage, however, of the continuing arbitration was virtually nonexistent. See
AMAzu A. Asouzu, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN STATES:
PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 315-17 (2001).
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political decision to sell to constituents. This barrier will be particu-
larly difficult to surmount if the investor was harmed due to the
state's implementation of a public policy or regulations that clearly
responded to the needs of its own people. In the CMS case described
supra, economists have argued that Argentina had no choice but to
devalue its currency in order to prevent further economic crises.52
How could the government negotiate the payment of millions of dol-
lars to a foreign company to compensate it (and its domestic partners)
for its economic loss when Argentina's citizens and wholly-owned do-
mestic companies clearly had lost so much more?
In addition, the state's authority to negotiate a voluntary settle-
ment is often unclear and requires traveling through several layers of
bureaucracy. 53 Many states have established a clear chain of com-
mand and a methodology to manage their participation in the arbi-
tration process. This is particularly true for those states that have
had the unfortunate but instructive experience of defending them-
selves against investors' claims.5 4 These states, their lawyers, and
officials in agencies and local units of government understand the
process of drafting the appropriate documents for arbitration pro-
ceedings, making the best arguments possible, marshaling the neces-
sary evidence, etc. In contrast, the internal negotiations among state
officials, agencies, and even local units of government to reach con-
sensus on settlement authority and a settlement range might be sig-
nificantly more difficult and time-consuming. Indeed, these internal
negotiations may be substantially more complex than the official ne-
gotiations across the table. 55
52. Peterson, supra note 29 (quoting Joseph Stiglitz).
53. In fact, lower-level diplomats might need protection in order to reach settle-
ment. Reportedly, in one case in Ecuador, the government official was actually crimi-
nally indicted for settling a case.
54. See Rogers, supra note 14, at 357 (discussing states that do not have suffi-
cient experience with investment arbitration); Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing
Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment
Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237, 255 (2007).
55. See INVESTOR-STATE DispuTEs, supra note 7 at 69-74; INVESTOR-STATE Dis-
PuTEs II, supra note 1 at 51; Andrea K. Schneider, Getting to NAFTA: A Review of
Interpreting NAFTA by Frederick W. Mayer, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 330, 338 (1999)
(discussing the difficulties of two-level diplomacy in trade and investment agree-
ments). These internal negotiations also may involve discussion of whether a state's
"judgment fund" is, or should continue to be, available to pay settlements, and if it is,
under what circumstances. See e.g., Payment of Judgments and Compromise Settle-
ments, 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2011); Judgment Fund Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 317,
113th Cong. (2013).
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While it is essential to recognize the unique constraints faced by
sovereign nations,56 it is just as essential to recognize that mediation
and other consensual processes are used regularly to resolve domestic
public policy, civil rights and major regulatory disputes that involve
extraordinarily difficult public and private issues and state actors.
This is another primary reason for this Article. The proponents of
investor-state mediation need to be aware of the successful use of me-
diation to resolve large, complex matters, as well as the relevance of
dispute system design principles and procedural justice theories and
research. Compliance with such principles, theories and research
makes it more likely that investor-state mediation will produce out-
comes that are perceived as fair and enhance the legitimacy of the
governmental actors that are involved.
A fourth, largely unspoken critique of mediation likely arises out
of lawyers' fears of losing some measure of their professional auton-
omy.57 The current system of investment treaty arbitration clearly
favors a traditional allocation of responsibilities between American
lawyers and their clients. Under these rules, a state instructs its
lawyers that its objective is to avoid making any payment to the for-
eign investor; the investor, meanwhile, instructs its lawyers that its
objective is to win compensation for past and future losses. The law-
yers then assume control over the "means" to achieve these relatively
clear objectives in the context of arbitration.58 Sophisticated state of-
ficials and investor representatives are likely to review legal briefs
and arguments, but even they are equally likely to delegate the au-
thority to advocate. 59 Granting affirmative authority to settle, how-
ever, is a more nuanced matter. States might want to retain more
56. Negotiations with sovereign states inevitably can bring up issues of sovereign
immunity, both in the domestic and foreign court system. Since the investor-state
treaty system relies on a state's waiver of this immunity (at least for the purposes of
arbitration), this article will not address that issue. Further academic study as to
how and when states should negotiate away their immunity is warranted.
57. See Nancy A. Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled: Challenges to
Persuading the Legal Profession to Define Problems More Humanistically, 2008 J.
Disp. RESOL. 45, 51-53 (2008) (exploring how the use of factors other than legal or
litigation-related analysis could threaten law's claim to significance and lawyers' pro-
fessional autonomy and authority); John Lande, Escaping from Lawyers' Prison of
Fear (describing events that could lead to loss of autonomy) (manuscript on file with
author).
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002). Note that the Rule pro-
vides that lawyers are to consult with their clients regarding the means to be used to
achieve the clients' objectives.
59. Increasingly, however, practitioners and commentators are encouraging cli-
ents and inside counsel to manage outside counsel more actively. See Sigfried H.
Elsing, On Babies and Bathwater: Keeping the Good (And Getting Rid of the Bad)
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control or might worry that their lawyers have insufficient under-
standing of the political and business consequences of settlement. If
a state wishes to pursue settlement and arbitration simultane-
ously,60 it must establish the delegation of additional responsibilities
and authority for settlement. Lawyers representing the states will
also have to become familiar, if they are not already, with mediation
representation skills. These skills-e.g., exploring underlying inter-
ests as well as the facts that are relevant to legal arguments, writing
mediation submissions, preparing clients for mediation, explaining
clients' positions persuasively to the other side, considering how the
mediator may assist communication, information-gathering, and ne-
gotiation-are all related to traditional advocacy skills, 61 but also dif-
fer because they assume that the ultimate audience is the other
disputant, rather than an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
The challenge of learning and implementing these new perspec-
tives and skills may help to explain American law firms' hesitation to
embrace mediation. Their expertise and approach have been
uniquely suited to domination of the legal frontier that is investor-
state arbitration, 62 and they may not relish the need to adopt a more
nuanced approach or add lawyers (sometimes called "settlement
counsel") with expertise in convening and consensus-building and a
From the Company's Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2010, supra note 17, at
307, 318-19 (discussing the need for parties to manage outside counsel in interna-
tional arbitration processes, but also noting the lack of a legal professional privilege
extending to in-house counsel); Frank H. Minaker et al., Arbitration of International
Commercial Disputes, in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs 2010, supra note 17, at 322, 327-32
(discussion of roles of outside counsel, inside counsel and business persons in arbitrat-
ing a commercial matter); see also Rogers, supra note 14.
60. Salacuse, supra note 9, at 166 (citing to an investor that stayed consistently
open to negotiation even after commencing arbitration).
61. See David H. Burt, Inside Counsel as Sophisticated Users of the Mediation
Process, in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs 2010, supra note 17, at 418, 419-28 (discussion of
the various important roles that inside counsel can and should play in preparing for
commercial mediation, including conducting early case assessment, developing a case
narrative, managing outside counsel, interacting with inside counsel of the opposing
party, and generally acting as process manager, intermediary and interpreter, skep-
tic, evaluator and negotiator); see also David Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New
Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2091-
03 (2010) (describing integration and knowledge transfer between international law
firms and multinational corporations, thus suggesting a growing convergence be-
tween outside counsel and their corporate clients); see generally Hal Abramson, MEDI-
ATION REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING AS A PROBLEM-SOLVER (3rd ed., 2013).
62. See Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled, supra note 57 at 57-59
(discussing psychological, professional and business reasons that lawyers may resist
mediation and other humanistic approaches to resolving disputes); Roger P. Alford,
The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
69, 80-82 (2003).
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cooperative style.63 States and investors, meanwhile, may find it eas-
ier to delegate the authority to advocate than delegate the authority
required to fashion a complex commercial settlement that also recog-
nizes political realities.
Several countervailing factors, however, suggest that the fears
just identified are unlikely to be effective in inhibiting the integration
of mediation. Probably most important is the fact that most of these
disputes settle already, albeit without conciliation, and the lawyers
in this context, as in so many others, are directly involved in such
settlement. In addition, based on domestic and international experi-
ence, many investors and states are already familiar with a court-
connected or court-oriented legal process called "mediation."64 Law-
yers play a central role in this process, whether it is used in bilateral
disputes, complex commercial matters, or class actions. Increasingly,
investors, states and lawyers also have experience with the some-
what different forms of mediation and facilitation used to resolve
large public policy disputes, including environmental issues involving
many stakeholders.6 5 Many states also generally welcome the use of
consensual processes as part of their cultural heritage.
63. See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep On
Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV.
L.J. 399 (2005) (based on the history of court-connected mediation in the U.S., ques-
tioning the likelihood that lawyers will accept and promote processes designed to en-
hance parties' self-determination, consider their extra-legal interests and offer the
potential for creative, mutually-beneficial solutions); but see Nancy A. Welsh, The
Reputational Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation In-
dex with Law Students, 28 NEGOT. J. 117, 130-34 (2012) (discussing the value to law-
yers of having a cooperative style) [hereinafter Reputational Advantages]; GERALD
WILLIAMS & CHARLES CRAVER, LEGAL NEGOTIATING 53-54 (2007); Charles Craver, Ne-
gotiation Styles: The Impact on Bargaining Transactions, 49 J. Disp. RESOL. 48, 50-53
(2003).
64. See Suzanne Ulicny, ICC ADR: Rules and Approaches for Reaching an Amica-
ble Solution, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2010, supra note 17, at 478, 478-80 (reporting
that ICC offers mediation, neutral evaluation, and minitrials, but that mediation is
the most popular of these processes); Luis M. Martinez & Thomas Ventrone, The
International Centre for Dispute Resolution Mediation Practice, in CONTEMPORARY IS-
SUES 2010, supra note 17, at 484, 484 (reporting that mediation is the process most
frequently used, although ICDR also offers early neutral evaluation, fact-finding,
minitrials, dispute resolution boards, partnering, double-blind bid settlement, and
non-binding arbitration).
65. See e.g., Barbara Gray & Julia Wondolleck, Environmental Disputes: Negoti-
ating Over Risks, Values and the Future, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION
(Mara Olekalns & Wendi Adair, eds., forthcoming 2013), Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating
the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in Siting Wind Turbines, 12 CARDOZo J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 327 (2011); Lawrence E. Susskind, Consensus Building and ADR:
Why They Are Not the Same Thing, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION]; THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
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Whether states are embracing mediation by developing their
own corps of quasi-mediators or bringing investment arbitration to a
point of crisis by withdrawing from BITs, the stage is set for the inte-
gration of mediation into the investment treaty context.66 The Inter-
national Bar Association's recent approval of rules to facilitate the
use of investor-state mediation offers substantial evidence that we
are reaching the "tipping point."67 These developments also suggest
the need for discipline and precision in defining the model or models
of mediation that will be used, the breadth of any compulsory ele-
ments, mechanisms for providing transparency and ensuring quality,
and the identity and role of the mediators. Such discipline and preci-
sion will come from adherence to the principles of dispute system de-
sign and the research and theories of procedural justice.
III. DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
A. Dispute System Design
No dispute or dispute resolution process exists in a vacuum.
Rather, every "conflict, issue, dispute, or case submitted to any insti-
tution for managing conflict (including one labeled ADR [alternative
dispute resolution]) exists in the context of a system of rules,
processes, steps, and forums. In the field of ADR, this is called dis-
pute system design. 68 Dispute system design is based on an amal-
gam of conflict theory, theories of organizational development, and an
understanding of both "traditional" and "alternative" dispute resolu-
tion. It provides guidance regarding the process to be used in struc-
turing a system, determining the component parts of the system, and
measuring the system's effectiveness.
RESOLUTION (Rosemary O'Leary & Lisa B. Bingham, eds., 2003); THE CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence
Susskind et al., eds., 1999); Nancy A. Welsh & Barbara Gray, Searching for a Sense of
Control: The Challenge Presented by Community Conflicts Over Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 295 (2002).
66. This balance between exit, voice, and loyalty to international regimes re-
mains an interesting one to explore as we move forward in adjusting the investment
treaty system. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (explaining this concept); Jo-
seph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (applying
this concept to the European Union).
67. See IBA Rules, supra note 39. Similarly, the balance between private and
public international law in the mixed context of investor-state dispute resolution is
also interesting. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Private and Public International Dis-
pute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 65.
68. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the
Rule of Law, 2011 J. DIsP. RESOL. 67, 74 (2011).
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Based on field experience resolving disputes in the coal industry,
William Ury, Jeanne Brett and Stephen Goldberg first wrote about
dispute system design in their 1988 book, Getting Disputes Re-
solved.69 They found that disputes in the workplace often are re-
solved through the use of power and rights, rather than interests.
When organizations focus on achieving power-based or rights-based
solutions, they miss the opportunity to find better solutions, better
engage their stakeholders, and save money.70 The second generation
of dispute system design, captured in Cathy Costantino and
Christina Sickles-Merchant's book, Designing Conflict Management
Systems,71 discusses how organizations create ADR methods most re-
sponsive to their needs in advance of the ripening of conflict. 72 In
thinking about the array of choices available to organizations, they
outline six categories of ADR processes: (1) preventative (e.g., dispute
69. WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988).
70. Id. at 7-8. In their book, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg outline six key principles
for designing a presumptively interests-oriented dispute resolution system: (1) put
the focus on interests; (2) build in opportunities to return [or "loop-back"] to negotia-
tions ("Loop-backs" are defined as the opportunity to continue to move around in the
process choices. So, for example, the parties should be able to go back and negotiate
at any stage outlined in a dispute resolution process and not be limited to a "negotia-
tion" stage that occurs early on. Similarly, the term "loop forward," developed in later
DSD literature, also means that parties can choose to jump around among the process
choices choosing to engage, for example, in fact-finding before negotiation.) (3) pro-
vide low-cost rights and power backups to interest-based processes; (4) build in con-
sultation before creating the dispute system and feedback after the implementation
and use of the system; (5) arrange procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence; and (6)
provide the necessary motivation, skills, and resources to permit participants and the
organization to begin with a focus on interests and then move to assertions of rights
and power only as necessary. Id. at 42. This prescription assumes, of course, that an
organization's goals include productivity and inexpensive, speedy resolution of con-
flicts. An organization with the goals of avoiding change or maintaining stability
might not be attracted to dispute system design.
71. CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1996).
72. Costantino and Merchant outline their principles as: (1) developing guide-
lines for whether ADR is appropriate; (2) tailoring the ADR process to the particular
problem; (3) building in preventative methods of ADR; (4) making sure that dispu-
tants have the necessary knowledge and skill to choose and use ADR; (5) creating
ADR systems that are simple to use and easy to access and that resolve disputes
early, at the lowest organizational level, with the least bureaucracy; and (6) allowing
disputants to retain maximum control over the choice of ADR method and selection of
neutral wherever possible. Id. at 120-121. Though not the primary focus of this Arti-
cle, it is also important to note that Costantino and Sickles-Merchant examine how
new dispute systems are developed, observing that some organizational leaders had
used rights-based mechanisms to impose interest-based processes upon stakeholders.
Id.
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resolution clauses, partnering, consensus building), (2) negotiated; (3)
facilitated (e.g., mediation, conciliation, institutional ombuds); (4)
fact-finding (e.g., neutral experts, masters); (5) advisory (e.g., early
neutral evaluation, non-binding arbitration);73 or (6) imposed (e.g.,
binding arbitration).
74
Applying this framework to investor-state disputes reveals that
the currently-dominant system for resolving investor-state disputes
relies explicitly on only one method in one category: binding arbitra-
tion, in the imposed category. As noted earlier, a few states have be-
gun to experiment with mechanisms that fit into the preventative
category and that are available to an investor even before it begins to
frame its concern as a "dispute,"75 or has to turn to arbitration.
Now in the "next generation" phase of dispute system design,
commentators agree that the best systems are characterized by the
following:76 (1) multiple process options for parties, 77 including
rights-based and interest-based processes; (2) ability for parties to
"loop back" and "loop forward" among these options; (3) substantial
stakeholder involvement in the system's design (with significant con-
cern about the perceived unfairness of dispute system design systems
designed by one disputing party and imposed upon the other
73. One of the confusing aspects of these terms in the investor-state context is
that "conciliation" as used in the treaties sounds like a facilitated process but, as de-
scribed in reality, appears to be closer to a nonbinding arbitration. See Salacuse,
supra note 9, at 173.
74. Note that today's ADR procedures do not fit as neatly as they once did into
the categories identified by Costantino and Merchant. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham,
Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Framework
for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. Disp. RESOL. 269, 291 (2009) (explaining
that processes for resolving conflict in policy-making vary along several dimensions,
including the participants, their authority and power to influence policy decisions,
and the process for communication and decision-making).
75. See, e.g., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 49, 68 (discussing vari-
ous initiatives taken by states to encourage prevention and negotiation of investor-
state disputes, including Japan's state-state joint commissions; Malaysia's and the
Philippines' broad consultations with their own governmental agencies during treaty
negotiations; Peru's coordination and response system, including its Special Commis-
sion; China's domestic administrative review process; and Colombia's lead agency
approach).
76. See, e.g., Stephanie Smith & Jan Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dis-
pute Systems Design, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 128 (2009).
77. This element is consistent with the arguments of commentators who have
promoted acceptance of "process pluralism." See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace
and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEo. L.J. 553,
554-56 (2006); John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives
Believe in Mediation, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 147-50 (2000).
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disputing parties78 ); (4) participation that is voluntary, confidential,
and assisted by impartial third party neutrals; (5) system trans-
parency and accountability; 79 and (6) education and training of stake-
holders on the use of available process options.
Dispute system design scholarship originally posited that the ini-
tial focus in resolving disputes should be on interests, rather than
rights or power.80 The current use of arbitration represents a move-
ment from power (when some states bullied each other or bullied in-
vestors) to rights (since states and investors are treated as equal
players, both bound by the terms of treaties and contracts). Media-
tion, if understood as a presumptively interest-based technique,
would represent the next movement, from rights to interests.
But the more recent evolution of dispute system design no longer
assumes that attempts at resolution must begin with an interest-
based process. Instead, the best dispute systems simply include an
interest-based process, and parties may begin with that process or
another and loop forward and backward among the available
processes. Meanwhile, as will be discussed infra, today's mediation
process is no longer assumed to be exclusively interest-based; rights
and power almost inevitably play a role. 8s So, integrating mediation
into the investment treaty context would provide investors and states
with the opportunity to resolve their disputes through a process that
provides for explicit consideration of their interests, consistent with
78. See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in
Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 22-24 (2009).
79. See id. at 32-33 (describing the evaluation of the USPS REDRESS system
based on users' perceptions of interactional justice (satisfaction with interpersonal
treatment experienced during mediation), procedural justice (satisfaction with the
process), and distributive justice (satisfaction with the outcome); Lisa Blomgren Bing-
ham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on Dispute
Resolution, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 101, 115 (2002) (observing that USPS established
percentage goals for voluntary employee participation which substantially influenced
the design of the REDRESS program).
80. See URY ET AL., supra note 69, at 18.
81. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been A Contender: Summary Jury
Trial as a Means to Overcome Iqbal's Negative Effects Upon Pre-Litigation Communi-
cation, Negotiation and Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
1149, 1172-85(2010) [hereinafter Contender] (discussion of how rights and power in-
fluence the likelihood, tenor and results of communication, negotiation and assisted
negotiation); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Con-
versations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 573, 594-606 (2004) [hereinafter Stepping Back] (discuss-
ing how perceptions of power and rights influence expectations and perceptions of
mediation); Salacuse, supra note 9.
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dispute system design principles, without eliminating consideration
of rights.
Throughout the years, dispute system design literature also has
consistently emphasized stakeholders' role in designing the dispute
system and the need to be able to demonstrate the system's positive
impacts upon efficiency, effectiveness, stakeholders' satisfaction, and
justice perceptions.8 2 Indeed, research suggests that stakeholders'
engagement in decision-making regarding the design of a dispute sys-
tem (including the processes that are included, the elements that are
compulsory, and mechanisms to assure both informed stakeholder
participation and system accountability), as well as their role in se-
lecting the particular process or processes they will use to resolve
their dispute and their subsequent experience with those processes,
all impact their perceptions of the procedural (and substantive) jus-
tice offered by the system and individual processes. This Article will
next turn, therefore, to a discussion of this research and theories of
procedural justice.
B. Procedural Justice
Empirical research reveals that decision-making and dispute
resolution procedures are most likely to be effective if they are per-
ceived as procedurally fair.8 3 If parties perceive a dispute resolution
or decision-making process as procedurally fair, they are more likely
to perceive the outcome as substantively fair even if it is adverse to
82. It may be worthwhile to note that McAdoo and Welsh proposed a framework
for evaluation that included efficient justice, substantive justice and procedural jus-
tice. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 63, at 425-29. See also Jeanne M. Brett, Ste-
phen B. Goldberg, and William L. Ury, Designing Systems for Resolving Disputes in
Organizations, 45 American Psychologist 162, 169 (1990) (exploring the relevance of
procedural justice to dispute system design, in terms of "incentives associated with
process").
83. See Nancy A. Welsh, Donna Stienstra & Bobbi McAdoo, The Application of
Procedural Justice Research to Judicial Actions and Techniques in Settlement Ses-
sions, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, eds., forthcoming 2013); Nancy A. Welsh, Percep-
tions of Fairness in Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 165, 170 (Andrea K.
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006) [hereinafter Perceptions]; Nancy A.
Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got To Do With
It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 818 (2001) [hereinafter Making Deals]; see generally E.
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66-70,
205 (1988); E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Au-
thorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 192 (Austin Sarat, et al.,
eds., 1998); Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J.
PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2000) [hereinafter Social Justice]; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind,
Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAw, 65, 68 (Joseph Sand-
ers & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
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them,8 4 comply with that outcome,8 5 and perceive the institution that
provides or sponsors the process as legitimate.8 6 Indeed, in the U.S.,
researchers have found that the public's overall approval of, and
confidence in, the courts are influenced most strongly by their
perception that the procedures offered by the courts are fair.8 7 Re-
searchers have found that perceptions of procedural justice matter in
decision-making processes as well as dispute resolution processes,88
in one-on-one negotiation8 9 as well as mediation 90 and arbitration, in
84. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 83, at 66-70, 205; Tyler, Social Justice: supra
note 83, at 119.
85. See Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 83, at 119; Lind, supra note 83, at 192;
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive
and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 850, 857 (1994) [herein-
after Psychological Models]; Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule
of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 661, 660-70, 673-74 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Rule of Law] (describing proce-
dural justice findings generally and research that has identified "procedural justice
and trust as the key antecedents of the willingness to defer to legal authorities").
86. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 83, at 209; ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW 94-108 (1990); Lind, supra note 83, at 188; DAVID B. RoTrmAN, TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS 24
(2005); Tyler, Rule of Law, supra note 85, at 665.
87. Meanwhile, most lawyers focus on the outcomes of these procedures. See
Tyler, Rule of Law, supra note 85, at 663 (reporting on research conducted in Califor-
nia and elsewhere); RoiTMAN, supra note 86, at 25 (reporting that the public's evalua-
tions of procedural fairness has greater influence on their evaluations of the courts,
while attorneys give more weight to outcomes; also noting that studies in other states
indicate that judges are also more concerned about outcome fairness than procedural
fairness).
88. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 83, at 211-12, 242 (1988), cited in Welsh, Mak-
ing Deals, supra note 83, at 817-18.
89. See Welsh, Perceptions, supra note 83, at 170; Welsh, Contender, supra note
81, at 1151-52; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Ne-
gotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 473, 477-79 (2008); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotia-
tion, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 385 (2010).
90. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know
from Empirical Research, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 447-50 (2010) (exploring proce-
dural justice effects of parties speaking in mediation compared to lawyers speaking);
Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know
from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641, 685 (2002) [hereinafter
Court-Connected Mediation] (reporting procedural justice effects of lawyers' perceived
cooperation in mediation); Tina Nabatchi et al., Organizational Justice and Work-
place Mediation: A Six-Factor Model, 18 INT'L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 148, 164 (2007)
(exploring procedural justice effects in transformative model of mediation); Nancy A.
Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 83, at 838-58 (applying procedural justice research
and theories to mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 81, at 647-51,
661, 669-71 (suggesting that the use of caucus may magnify both positive and nega-
tive procedural justice perceptions).
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workplaces as well as courts, 91 and in countries with very different
cultures.
9 2
Four process characteristics reliably predict parties' perceptions
of fairness: the opportunity for parties to express themselves and
their positions ("voice"), 93 demonstration of sincere consideration of
these expressions by a trustworthy decision-maker ("being heard"),
94
even-handed treatment and the neutrality of the forum,95 and
dignified, respectful treatment.9 6  Parties assess decision-makers'
91. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 83, at 211-12. But see Kristina A. Diekmann et
al., Does Fairness Matter More to Some than to Others? The Moderating Role of Work-
place Status on the Relationship Between Procedural Fairness Perceptions and Job
Satisfaction, 20 Soc. JUST. RES. 161, 163 (2007) (reporting research demonstrating
that procedural justice has less influence with individuals of higher status in work-
place); Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al., Procedural Justice and Intragroup Status:
Knowing Where We Stand in a Group Enhances Reactions to Procedures, 41 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 644, 667-69 (2005); Jody Clay-Warner, Perceiving Procedural
Injustice: The Effects of Group Membership and Status, 64 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 227-
35 (2001).
92. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 83, at 821.
93. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 83, at 211-212; Lind, supra note 83, at 180;
Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 83, at 121 (describing voice as the opportunity for
people to present their "suggestions" or "arguments about what should be done to
resolve a problem or conflict" or "sharing the discussion over the issues involved in
their problem or conflict" and also noting that voice effects have been found even
when people know they will have little or no influence on decision makers); Nourit
Zimmerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psy-
chological Perspective, 37 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 488 (2010) (reporting that voice
"shapes evaluations about neutrality, trust, and respect" and has the "strongest influ-
ence, followed respectively by neutrality, trust, and respect").
94. See Lind, supra note 83, at 179; Donald E. Conlon, et al., Nonlinear and
Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome on Procedural and Distributive Fairness Judg-
ments, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1095 (1989); Tyler, Psychological Models,
supra note 85, at 858; Tyler, Rule of Law, supra note 85, at 664; Tyler, Social Justice,
supra note 83, at 122.
95. See Tyler, Rule of Law, supra note 85, at 664 (observing that "[t]ransparency
and openness foster the belief that decision-making procedures are neutral"); see also
Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice:
Defining the Meaning of a "Fair" Process, 29 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL. BUL. 747 (2003)
(distinguishing between "formal" or "structural" aspects of groups that influence per-
ceptions of process fairness, such as group rules, and the "informal" influences that
result from individual authority's actual implementation of the rules); Welsh, Stien-
stra & McAdoo, supra note 83 (suggesting "two quite different perspectives" regarding
even-handed treatment, with the first perspective focusing on "interactional or rela-
tional matters" and the second perspective focusing on cognitive issues such as
"whether or not the process provides a sufficiently informed and fact-based applica-
tion of objective principles").
96. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-
Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 830, 831 (1989); E. Allan Lind, et
al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the
Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 953, 948 (1990); Tyler, Social Justice,
supra note 83, at 122. While respectful treatment is described here as an essential
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trustworthiness 97 in order to determine whether they "can trust that
in the long run the [decision-making] authority with whom they are
dealing will work to serve their interests."98 Perhaps because parties
element of procedural justice, it has also been described as an element of interactional
justice, and even of distributive justice. See Robert J. Bies, Are Procedural Justice
and Interactional Justice Conceptually Distinct?, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
JUSTICE 85 (Jerald A. Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt, eds., 2005). See also Welsh,
Perceptions, supra note 83, at 170; Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice
in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 49, 52 (2004); Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 83, at 820-21.
Tom R. Tyler, one of the most prominent procedural justice researchers, has described
these four elements slightly differently:
What makes a process fair in the eyes of the public? Four critical factors
dominate evaluations of procedural justice. First, people want to have an
opportunity to state their case to legal authorities. They want to have a fo-
rum in which they can tell their story; they want to have a "voice" in the
decision-making process. Second, people react to signs that the authorities
with whom they are dealing are neutral. Neutrality involves making deci-
sions based upon consistently applied legal principles and the facts of the
case rather than personal opinions and biases. Transparency and openness
foster the belief that decision-making procedures are neutral. Third, people
are sensitive to whether they are treated with dignity and politeness and to
whether their rights as citizens and as people are respected. Finally, people
focus on cues that communicate information about the intentions and charac-
ter of the legal authorities with whom they are dealing. People react favora-
bly to the perception that the authorities are benevolent and caring and are
sincerely trying to do what is best for the public-that is, when they trust
that authority. Authorities communicate this concern when they listen to
people's accounts and explain or justify their actions in ways that show an
awareness of people's needs.
Tyler, Rule of Law, supra note 85, at 664.
97. Lind, supra note 83, at 192; see also Tyler & Lind, supra note 83, at 768 (re-
framing "trust" as "trust in benevolence" and defining this relational term as "infer-
ences about the authority's motivations, especially the authority's willingness to
consider one's needs and to try to make fair decisions").
98. Tyler, Psychological Models, supra note 85, at 854. A key question, of course,
is what serves as the ultimate basis for people's assessment of whether a decision-
maker is well-meaning and trustworthy. One of the authors of this article has sug-
gested a meaningful correlation among the behaviors that signal procedural justice, a
cooperative style, and perceived trustworthiness. If a decision-maker behaves in a
procedurally just manner and has a cooperative style, this tends to be correlated with
trustworthiness, and the resulting atmosphere of trust has been shown to generate
greater willingness to share the sort of information that leads to mutually-beneficial,
integrative solutions. See Nancy A. Welsh, Reputational Advantages, supra note 63,
at 132-33 (citing to Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 89. This line of research
suggests that the outcomes produced by a decision-maker who is perceived as well-
meaning and trustworthy are likely to be viewed as fair and also likely to be more
integrative. But this effect has also been shown to be moderated by pre-existing per-
ceptions of the decision-maker's trustworthiness-or lack of trustworthiness. In
other words, procedurally just behaviors will not have their usual effects if the deci-
sion-maker is distrusted; they will have their usual effects when there is no informa-
tion about the trustworthiness of the decision-maker and their effects may be
enhanced when the decision-maker is trusted. See David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler,
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realize that these procedural characteristics can be manipulated,
however, they tend to be on high alert for "sham" procedures. 99 For
fairly obvious reasons, parties are likely to be particularly vigilant
regarding the potential for a "sham" when they are uncertain that
they can trust the others involved a dispute resolution process and/or
the dispute is a very serious one, involving the potential for grievous
harm.100
Several theories explain why parties care so much about proce-
dural justice. First, parties want to be reassured that the decision-
maker has access to, and considers, the information they present. If
the decision-maker has this information, and demonstrates consider-
ation of it, parties are more willing to believe that their interests will
be protected. 10 1 Indeed, because it can be so difficult to determine
whether an outcome is substantively fair, some have theorized that
parties' judgment regarding the fairness of a procedure acts as a heu-
ristic for their judgments regarding the fairness of outcomes.102 Sec-
ond, the procedures themselves communicate whether the parties
The Effects of Trust in Authority and Procedural Fairness in Cooperation, 92 J. OF
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 639, 646-47 (2007); see also David Markell, et al., What's Love Got
To Do With It?: Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making, 57 VILL. L. REV.
209, 239-40 (2012) (reporting research finding that trust in the motives of authorities
is primary when sentimental values are at stake, while perceiving a decision-maker
to be neutral is most important when monetary interests are primary).
99. See Lind, supra note 83, at 187 (observing that if people perceive evidence of
unfair treatment or perceive "false representations of fair treatment," they respond
with "extremely negative reactions"); Tom R. Tyler, et al., Influence of Voice on Satis-
faction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALIY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 74 (1985) (explaining that, under certain conditions, voice without
decision control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with
leaders, a result described as the "frustration effect").
100. See Welsh, Reputational Advantages, supra note 63, at 136-138 (regarding
the relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and trustworthiness, and
the appropriate incidence of distrust); Andrea K. Schneider, Perception, Reputation
and Reality: An Empirical Study of Negotiation Skills, 6 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 24 Sum-
mer 2000, at 24.
101. This is described as the "social exchange" theory. People wish to know that
the decision maker is fully informed regarding their perspective, in hopes that this
will influence the outcome. See Lind, supra note 83, at 179. Recent research also
interestingly suggests that in negotiation, the creation of integrative solutions is cor-
related with procedurally just behaviors. See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note
89, at 477-79.
102. See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 224, 225 (1993) (re-
porting that researchers found that procedural justice judgments strongly influenced
litigants' decisions about whether or not to accept nonbinding arbitration awards, re-
gardless of whether litigants were individuals, small business owners, or corporate
officers; only corporate employees demonstrated no link between their procedural jus-
tice judgments and their decisions to accept awards).
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accessing those procedures are deserving of respect. If the neutral in
a dispute resolution process listens to the parties before her and con-
sistently demonstrates both respect and a sincere attempt to be open-
minded and even-handed, these behaviors signal to the parties that
they are valued members of the group, regardless of whether that
group is a nation, a local community, or a workplace.103 Refusal to
listen or closed-mindedness signals a lack of respect. More recently,
Allan Lind and others have urged that parties use their perceptions
of procedure as a mechanism to manage the negative dynamics, sense
of vulnerability, and risk often associated with uncertainty. 10 4 A fair
procedure communicates the decision maker's (and the sponsoring in-
stitution's) respect for, and well-meaning attitude toward, the party
which can then help to reduce the anxieties associated with actual
loss, feared loss, and/or an uncertain future.
Recent research has also revealed that although procedural jus-
tice matters to most people, it can matter to some people more than
others. For example, those who perceive themselves as having lower
or uncertain status are more likely to perceive a just outcome if the
higher status decision-maker-who could be the neutral or the other
negotiator-treats them in a procedurally just manner.10 5 Parties
who are collectivists or who find themselves in situations that accen-
tuate hierarchy and unequal status106 are also likely to be very
aware if they are treated in a procedurally just manner.107 Individu-
alists and higher status parties, in contrast, are much less influenced
by procedural justice. Indeed, their positive perceptions regarding a
103. This is the "group value" or "relational" theory. People notice the psychologi-
cal message that procedures convey regarding their value to the relevant social group.
To receive respect and sincere consideration signals the individual's value and social
standing. See Tyler, Psychological Models, supra note 85, at 858.
104. See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 89, at 477 (citing E. Allan Lind,
Fairness Judgments as Cognitions, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE,
(Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002)); Kees van den Bos & E. Allan Lind, Uncer-
tainty Management by Means of Fairness Judgments, 34 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 26-30 (2002). See also Nancy A. Welsh & Barbara Gray, Searching
for a Sense of Control: The Challenge Presented By Community Conflicts Over Concen-
trated Animal Feeding Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 295 (2002).
105. See Welsh, Perceptions, supra note 83, at 170-71.
106. See id. at 166.
107. See id. at 170 (citing to Jan Wilhelm Van Prooijen et al., Procedural Justice
and Status Salience as Antecedent of Procedural Fairness Effect, 83 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1353, 1359 (2002) ); see also Clay-Warner, supra note 91, at 227-35;
Diekmann et al., supra note 91, at 163; Van Prooijen et al., supra note 91, at 667-69.
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process will matter less than the "bottom line"-i.e., whether the out-
come is at least consistent with their expectations.10 8
Procedural justice research is particularly important in the in-
vestment treaty context, as some states threaten noncompliance and
as all stakeholders express a desire to know that they are being
treated fairly within a system that they perceive as legitimate. It is
obviously important that states and investors perceive the invest-
ment treaty arbitration process as procedurally just.10 9 Procedural
justice theories and research can provide useful procedural
benchmarks to arbitrators and arbitral organizations committed to
108. See JANE ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTS-
BURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM, 61-62 (1983) (discussing difference between or-
ganizational and individual parties' reactions to Pittsburgh arbitration program);
Lind et al., supra note 102, at 247 (reporting that procedural justice judgments
strongly influenced litigants' decisions whether or not to accept non-binding arbitra-
tion awards, regardless of whether litigants were individuals, small business owners,
or corporate officers, except that corporate employees failed to demonstrate such link);
Wayne Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil Justice,
22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 227, 237-38 (2007) (expressing no surprise that "big-
time economic actors" would acquire thicker "'process skin'" and be "much more con-
cerned about ends than means ... [and thus] not likely to mind a little 'process rough-
ness' if they sense that it increases the odds that they will get a deal"); Tyler, Social
Justice, supra note 83, at 123 (describing the significance of social categorization and
referencing research showing that "people are less concerned about justice when they
are dealing with people who are outside their own ethnic or social group;" and "when
people have a dispute with someone who is not a member of their own social group,
they pay more attention to the personal favourability of a proposed dispute resolution
when deciding whether to accept it"); Diane Sivasubramaniam & Larry Heuer, Deci-
sion Makers and Decision Recipients: Understanding Disparities in the Meaning of
Fairness, 44 CT. REV. 62, 66 (2007-2008) (reporting several experiments that demon-
strated that those assuming the role of authority or decisionmaker were more likely to
define fairness in terms of outcome, while those who were decision recipients were
more likely to be concerned with respectful, fair treatment). But see Donna Shestow-
sky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex
Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 Con. L. REV. 63, 94-106 (2008)
(finding that those who expressed pre-process preference for a process in which a
third party made the decision were likely to be satisfied with that process, and detail-
ing research indicating that corporations prefer mediation due to their ability to con-
trol outcome, which can be understood as being consistent with achieving
expectations).
109. See Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in
Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 825 (2011) (testing the legitimacy of ICSID by
using empirical analysis to demonstrate that ICSID results are not different than
other arbitral processes); Dohyun Kim, The Annulment Committee's Role in Multiply-
ing Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away From an Annulment-
Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 255-56 (2011) (outlining social legitimacy as
decisions that are perceived as justified and that states accept are justified); William
W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the
Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 199, 288
(2008).
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achieving these goals. 110 Perceptions regarding the procedural jus-
tice of investment treaty mediation, however, will also matter.111 In
fact, perceived and actual procedural justice should be the goal for all
of the dispute resolution procedures that comprise the dispute resolu-
tion system available in the investment treaty context.
112
Further, we should take a step back to examine the decision-
making process that leads to the development of the dispute resolu-
tion clauses in investment treaties, including such clauses' definition
of the array of available processes and the mechanism that will deter-
mine the process to be used for a particular dispute. Research sug-
gests that stakeholders' perceptions of procedural justice are likely to
matter just as much in this "upstream" decision-making context as in
the later "downstream" dispute resolution process." 3 Professor Lisa
110. See, e.g., Roger K. Warren, Public Trust and Procedural Justice, 37 CT. REV.
3, 12, 15 (2000) (describing procedural justice-related performance criteria used in
court-sponsored evaluation programs and proposing additional measurement of trust-
worthiness); Judge Kevin Burke & Judge Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key
Ingredient in Public Satisfaction: A White Paper, 44 CT. REV. 1/2, 4-5 (2007). The Na-
tional Center for State Courts offers CourTools, Trial Court Performance Measures
that include a series of questions focusing on litigants' perceptions regarding access to
the courts and the fairness of their procedures. See CourTools: Giving Courts the
Tools to Measure Success (2005) [hereinafter CourTools], available at http:ll
www.courtools.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CourTools/
CourToolsTrialBrochure.ashx
111. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 83, at 170; Welsh, Stepping Back, supra
note 81, at 606; McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 63, at 410, 416, 420, 423-27 (discussing
data that supports and does not support court-connected mediation's achievement of
procedural justice and making recommendations based on such data); Bobbi McAdoo,
A Mediation Tune-Up for the State Court Appellate Machine, 2010 J. Disp. RESOL.
327, 328-32 (2010) (describing procedural justice and suggesting that appellate medi-
ation can be structured to achieve both settlement and procedural justice).
112. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 83, at 170; see also Nancy A. Welsh, The
Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDozo J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 124-33 (2004) [hereinafter Place of Mediation]; Nancy A. Welsh,
What is "(I'm) Partial Enough" in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIz. L. REV.
395, 423-28 (2010) [hereinafter Embedded Neutrals].
113. See Bingham, supra note 68, at 74. See also Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Design-
ing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 5 (2008) (using Elinor Ostrom's seven categories for institutional
design analysis and outlining a table/tautology of different types of justice); Keith G.
Allred, Relationship Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Contention with Cooperation, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 65, at 83, 91 (Michael L. Moffitt
& Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION] ("If
we are in a dispute with someone and he or she asks us what we think the process
should be to try to resolve it, we will feel the process is fairer whatever the process
turns out to be"); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: The
"Problem" in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEo. MASON L. REV. 863, 928 (2008) (pro-
posing that courts should allow parties to customize court-connected mediation and
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Bingham has noted, "[iln its best practice, DSD... uses inclusive, par-
ticipatory, stakeholder-driven processes to change existing or create
new dispute resolution structures. Its goal is to improve the capacity
of systems to prevent, manage, or resolve certain streams or kinds of
conflict." 114 Stakeholders are likely to perceive procedural justice in
this sort of "inclusive, participatory" process, used to design or amend
the dispute resolution clause in an investment treaty, if and only if
they receive the opportunity for voice, serious and trustworthy con-
sideration, and even-handed, dignified treatment in a neutral fo-
rum.11 5 In other words, their perceptions of procedural justice will
depend upon how their participation is managed. Such perceptions
will matter because they will influence stakeholders' perceptions re-
garding the substantive justice of the treaty's dispute resolution
clause and prescription of particular procedures. It will also impact
the likelihood of the stakeholders' compliance with the treaty provi-
sions and their respect for the legitimacy of the states engaged in
making the treaty. Thus, attention to procedural justice should en-
hance the effectiveness of the participatory stakeholder processes
prescribed by dispute system design. 116
urging that such opportunity will enhance parties' perceptions of procedural fairness
of process).
114. Bingham, supra note 68, at 75; see also URY ET AL., supra note 69, at 65-83
(1988); John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 115
(2002).
115. See also Nancy A. Welsh & Barbara Gray, Searching for a Sense of Control:
The Challenge Presented By Community Conflicts Over Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 295,303-5 (2002). Note that "participation" is
sometimes used as a synonym for "voice." See, e.g., Zimmerman & Tyler, supra note
93, at, 487 ("a study of small claims courts found that the opportunity for direct, un-
mitigated participation-especially the opportunity for the litigant to tell his story
before a judge-was an important determinant of the litigant's satisfaction"). But
active "participation" in a decision-making process is likely to require something more
than just "voice." It requires give-and-take, and listening as well as expressing one's
own point of view. See Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 81, at 606. Researchers
have found that while mediating parties' perceptions of procedural justice are en-
hanced by the opportunity to "tell their views," these perceptions are not affected by
the opportunity to "participate" in the process. This has led Roselle Wissler to suggest
that "parties' sense of voice is more important to their experience in mediation than is
how much they participate." Wissler, supra note 90, at 450.
116. Of course, the devil is in the details. The stakeholders invited to participate
in a DSD process should include not just the official representatives of the states re-
sponsible for negotiating an investment treaty, but also representatives of the local
and regional regulatory bodies that will be obligated to uphold (or avoid violating) the
states' treaty obligations. Similarly, the process should include respected representa-
tives of both large (and arguably multinational) foreign investors and the much
smaller investors who may choose to invoke the new system. See Salacuse, supra note
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Much later, when a particular dispute emerges, dispute system
design's preference for loop-backs and loop-forwards suggests that
the designated dispute resolution facility should provide the disput-
ing state actors and investors with another opportunity for input-
into the selection of the particular process that will be used to resolve
their dispute (including, if appropriate, the particular model of that
process), 117 the timing of such process, and the particular neutral or
neutrals who will conduct the process. Again, the opportunity for
such input 118 is likely to have positive effects in terms of procedural
justice perceptions, provided that the parties believe that their input
is being received respectfully, given serious and trustworthy consid-
eration, and judged in an even-handed manner in a neutral forum." 9
With this brief introduction to dispute system design and proce-
dural justice, this Article will now turn to an examination of the expe-
rience with court-connected and court-oriented mediation in the U.S.
This examination will reveal significant variations among mediation
models. Only some of these variations are different enough from
other available procedures (especially conciliation) to meet dispute
9; see also Chris Carlson, Convening, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE To REACHING AGREEMENT 169 (Lawrence Susskind et al., eds.,
1999) (discussing the convening function); BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING
COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS 261-7 (1989); BERNARD MAYER, THE DY-
NAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 225 (2000); Laurel S.
Terry, From GATS to APEC: The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal Services, 43
AKRON L. REV. 875, 888-89 (2010) (demonstrating the value of "conversation starter"
provisions in international trade agreement that require the development of cross-
border professional services working groups and have resulted in the active participa-
tion of state judiciaries responsible for the regulation of lawyers).
117. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 919-21 (proposing that U.S. courts
and private dispute resolution providers should provide parties with the opportunity
to customize their mediation process and describing some courts' current processes for
such customization); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 44 (explaining effectiveness of
some courts' voluntary mediation programs and emphasizing the role of court person-
nel who reach out to parties).
118. The state will almost inevitably have received its opportunity for direct input
when the treaty was being drafted and the mandated dispute system was being de-
signed. Even if investor representatives and selected local government officials also
were engaged in the treaty-drafting process, the individual investor and local officials
involved in a particular dispute might not receive the opportunity for direct input
until much later. See Bingham, supra note 78, at 22-24 (discussing the importance of
determining who will choose the particular process to be used to resolve a dispute); see
also Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 869 (discussing issues on customization). But
see Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box, 88 IowA L. REV. 601 (discussing the
perils of having too many choices); Jean Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitra-
tion (If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEv. L.J. 82 (2007).
119. But recall, once again, that the disputing parties are likely to be quite vigi-
lant for signs that their participation is actually just a "sham." See Welsh, Embedded
Neutrals, supra note 112, at 423-28.
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system design's prescription for multiple process options, interest-
based processes as well as processes based on rights and power, and
the need for meaningful loop-backs and loop-forwards. The Article
will also examine the many variations among compulsory mediation
referral schemes in order to find those few that are most likely to
meet dispute system design's prescription for stakeholder involve-
ment as well as the opportunity for voice, serious and trustworthy
consideration, and even-handed, neutral and dignified treatment
that lead to procedural justice perceptions. Finally, the Article will
discuss potential quality controls in the selection and performance of
the pool of mediators, to provide for accountability pursuant to dis-
pute system design.
IV. THE MEDIATION PROCESS, REFERRAL SCHEMES
AND QUALITY CONTROL MECHANISMS
A. The Mediation Process
1. Basic Differences between Mediation and Arbitration
It is a truism that mediation and arbitration are different. But
closer examination reveals that mediation is substantively different
from arbitration-i.e., binding arbitration12 0-in only one key re-
spect: the neutral's degree of control over the outcome. 121 In media-
tion, the neutral (or mediator) assists the parties with their
communications and negotiation. She cannot impose a solution. If
there is a binding resolution reached in mediation, it will be the re-
sult of the parties' voluntary agreement.1 22 In contrast, at least in
binding arbitration, decision-making power vests in arbitrators
alone. They have the authority to decide outcomes for parties and
120. On occasion, researchers have treated mediation and non-binding arbitration
as essentially the same. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Proce-
dures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871,
876-78 (1997).
121. Researchers have found that this distinction matters. See e.g., Shestowsky &
Brett, supra note 108, at 94-106. (reporting research showing that disputant choice
between mediation and arbitration is based largely on desired level of third party
control over the outcome)
122. Of course, case law suggests that this ideal is not always met. See Nancy A.
Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Court-Annexed Mediation: The Inevitable Price of In-
stitutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (2001) [hereinafter Thinning Vi-
sion]; see also Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 179,
181-84(2002) [hereinafter Hollow Promise]; James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson,
Disputing Irony A Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 43, 127-38 (2006).
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issue binding awards. 123 Indeed, in the U.S. domestic context, arbi-
tral awards often appear more binding than those issued by many
courts. And, in the international context, there is no question that
arbitration awards are easier to enforce than court judgments or ne-
gotiated agreements.
124
In common law countries, arbitration also tends to have a differ-
ent "look" than mediation. While mediation looks more like an infor-
mal meeting, binding arbitration mimics a more formal judicial
hearing. 125 The arbitration process can feature opening statements,
direct and cross examination of witnesses, determinations regarding
the admissibility of documents into evidence, and even closing argu-
ments. While the arbitrators may interrupt the parties' presenta-
tions to ask questions, the parties present their cases in sequential
order. If lawyers are involved, the parties and witnesses tend to tes-
tify only in response to the lawyers' or the arbitrators' questions.
Each party's case is presented in the presence of the other party. The
process is structured to ensure that there is transparency, at least as
between the parties,1 26 and that the arbitrators have the information
needed to make their decision, which will be binding upon the
parties.127
In contrast to the comparatively formal arbitration process, me-
diation in these common law countries is a much less-obviously struc-
tured affair. The process often, but not always, begins with pre-
mediation submissions and telephonic conferences with the mediator.
On the day of the mediation, the parties meet in a conference room,
123. Note, however, that there are also important variations on binding arbitra-
tion that make the size of the award or its finality contingent party choice. For exam-
ple, in non-binding arbitration a party may choose to reject the award and proceed to
a different adjudicative process or litigation. In high-low arbitration or baseball arbi-
tration, the parties agree to constrain the arbitrator's discretion in making a mone-
tary award.
124. But see Edna Sussman, The New York Convention Through a Mediation
Prism, 15 Disp. RESOL. MAG., 10 Summer 2009 (referencing other nations' approaches
for enforcing judicially-brokered agreements).
125. But see Elsing, supra note 59, at 313 (describing fast-track arbitration, chess
clock arbitration, and guillotine arbitration).
126. See Coe, Transparency, supra note 7, at 1345 n. 32 (describing various mea-
sures undertaken to make the NAFTA arbitration regime more transparent for non-
parties-e.g., presumptively open arbitration hearings, participation by non-dispu-
tant states and amici).
127. See LEONARD L. RISKIN, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAwYERS 557-58
(4th ed. 2009) (discussing the role of the arbitrator, and the components needed for a
successful arbitration); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BE-
YoND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 483-491(2nd ed, 2011) (discussing arbitration skills
and typical format).
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and the process often (but not always) begins with an orientation by
the mediator and opening statements by each side. The mediators
and parties may remain together throughout the process but are
more likely to separate into different rooms, with the mediator "shut-
tling" among them. If the parties have separated and reach resolu-
tion, they may reconvene for a joint meeting to confirm the terms of
the settlement. The process is structured to permit the parties to en-
gage in joint and direct communication with each other, but also pri-
vate deliberation and, through the medium of ex parte meetings with
the mediator, indirect communication with each other.128 Thus
structured, the process ensures that the parties-rather than a third
party decision-maker-have sufficient information to allow them to
reach a decision that they can accept and will implement.
Last, mediation tends to differ from arbitration in its explicit
consideration of the parties' interests. Indeed, some courts in the
U.S. describe mediation as follows:
Mediation is a process in which parties and counsel agree to
meet with a neutral mediator trained to assist them in settling
disputes. The mediator improves communication across party
lines, helps parties articulate their interests and understand
those of the other party, probes the strengths and weaknesses of
each party's legal positions, and identifies areas of agreement
and helps generate options for a mutually agreeable resolution
to the dispute. In all cases, mediation provides an opportunity to
explore a wide range of potential solutions and to address inter-
ests that may be outside the scope of the stated controversy or
which could not be addressed by judicial action. A hallmark of
mediation is its capacity to expand traditional settlement dis-
cussions and broaden resolution options, often by exploring liti-
gant needs and interests that may be formally independent of
the legal issues in controversy.
129
128. See Jennifer G. Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80
VA. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (1994); Ian Ayres & Barry J. Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as
a Barrier to Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1631, 1633-34 (1997); Welsh, Stepping
Back, supra note 81, at 647-51, 660-71; Nancy A. Welsh, Musings on Mediation,
Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats, 33 U. LAVERNE L. REV. 5, 13 n. 42 (2011) [here-
inafter Musings] (observing that mediators' ability to engage in ex parte communica-
tions with parties is emerging as one of the process's "most-prized attributes").
129. S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 83.8 (2011) (applying exclusively to the Eastern
District).
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Thus, in general, mediation offers the opportunity for parties to
discuss both their legal and extra-legal issues and needs. In the in-
vestor-state context, these may include financial constraints or aspi-
rations, domestic political realities, regional concerns, and protection
of important community norms or characteristics.
2. A More Nuanced Appreciation of the Relationships Among
Models of Mediation, Arbitration, and Other
Processes
It is easy and tempting, however, to overstate the differences be-
tween mediation and arbitration. In fact, the differences may not be
obvious at all in terms of outcome, "look," or focus. Regarding the
neutral's degree of control over the outcome, for example, the lawyers
and parties in a nation with a common law tradition like the U.S.
may be willing to grant substantial deference to a mediator's reac-
tions and opinions, thus giving the mediator near-control over the
outcome. This is likely to be especially true if the lawyers and parties
have selected the mediator for his substantive knowledge, relevant
mediation experience, status, facility for managing the process, per-
ceived even-handedness, and general temperament. In other words,
even in common law countries, a mediator may represent a
"respected elder" within the relevant legal and business communi-
ties.130 Though the mediator does not have the authority to impose a
solution, his assessments and suggestions have the potential to be
extremely influential. 131 For the parties, meanwhile, sharing out-
come control with an adversary may not feel substantially different
from ceding control to a third party decisionmaker.1
32
130. Christopher Honeyman & Sandra Cheldelin, Have Gavel, Will Travel: Dis-
pute Resolution's Innocents Abroad, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 363, 365-7 (2002); see also
Salacuse, supra note 9, at 35.
131. See Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, The Secrets of Successful (and
Unsuccessful) Mediators, 8 Disp. RESOL. ALERT 1, 5-6 (2008) [hereinafter Goldberg &
Shaw I]; Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, The Secrets of Successful (and
Unsuccessful) Mediators Continued: Studies Two and Three, 23 NEGOT. J. 393, 407
(2007) [hereinafter Goldberg & Shaw II]; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 874 (cit-
ing research studies showing that lawyers prefer mediators who are litigators with
relevant substantive expertise who will provide their opinions regarding the merits of
the parties' cases as well as a suggested settlement range and that cases are signifi-
cantly more likely to settle in mediation if the parties select their own mediator).
132. See Welsh, Hollow Promise, supra note 122, at 183.
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Similarly, the strength of the distinction between arbitration and
mediation in terms of their "look" is likely to depend upon the partic-
ular models of arbitration and mediation that are used.133 In some
models of mediation, for example, the mediator focuses on encourag-
ing the disputing parties to express themselves, understanding their
values and underlying interests, helping them to communicate fully,
respectfully, and productively with each other, asking them questions
to help them be realistic, and fostering their ability to develop their
own customized solutions.134 These models tend to be called "facilita-
tive,"1 35 "elicitive,"' 36 "understanding-focused,"' 37 "therapeutic,"'
3 8
133. Other scholars have used different taxonomies to distinguish among different
mediator behaviors. See, e.g., Salacuse, supra note 9, at 160 (distinguishing the fol-
lowing "basic areas that mediators seek to address in their efforts to facilitate a nego-
tiated agreement between the parties: a) process, b) communications, and c)
substance"); Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method in the Mad-
ness of Mediation?: Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Media-
tion, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MEDIATION: NEW APPROACHES AND FINDINGS 19, 27,
36-37 (Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner eds., 2009) (identifying "three fun-
damental mediator strategies along a continuum ranging from low to high interven-
tion . . . (a) communication-facilitation; (b) procedural strategies; and (c) directive
strategies" and reporting that international mediators, with significant resources and
high status and using directive strategies, are most likely to achieve settlements in
high-intensity disputes, while regional mediators, with cultural similarity and using
procedural strategies, are most likely to achieve settlements in low-intensity con-
flicts); Goldberg & Shaw I, supra note 131, at 3; Goldberg & Shaw II, supra note 131,
at 394-98, 407-08, 410-13; Nadja Alexander, The Mediation Meta Model: Understand-
ing Practice, 26 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 97, 98 (2008) (proposing the following categories
of mediation: settlement mediation, facilitative mediation, transformative mediation,
expert advisory mediation, wise counsel mediation, and tradition-based mediation);
John Wood, Mediation Styles: Subjective Description of Mediators, 21 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 437, 447-8 (2004) (describing various styles as counselor, negotiator,
facilitator and democrat).
134. Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 869; Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note
122, at 17-20.
135. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies,
and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 24 (1996) (dis-
cussing mediation in facilitative form where the mediator clarifies and enhances com-
munications between parties in order to help them come to decision).
136. See Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and
the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (explaining that medi-
ation can be performed in elicitive fashion).
137. See GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIA-
TION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008).
138. See Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAw
& POL'y 7, 12, 19 (1986) (suggesting mediation process is similar to therapeutic
event); see also CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATE-
GIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT, 41 (2d ed. 1996) (describing other categories such as
"social network mediators," "authoritative mediators," and "independent
mediators'"-categories that have more to do with relationships between mediator
and disputants than particular types of interventions that they tend to use).
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"humanistic,"139 "narrative,"'140 "insight,"' 41 and "transformative."1 42
Such models permit the parties to play a central role if they wish,
though they also may choose to defer to their lawyers. There are
meaningful differences among these models, but they tend to value
communication among the parties, reflective listening, and the use of
joint sessions for as long as they are productive.
143
Particularly in complex matters, whether they are commercial,
environmental, or court-connected, mediators using these models are
likely to engage in substantial "pre-mediation" work. These
mediators are likely to review court documents, require pre-media-
tion submissions from the parties, and confer with the lawyers (and
139. See Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: A Transformative Journey of
Peacemaking (1997) available at http://www.cehd.umn.edu/ssw/rjp/resources/rj_dia-
logue-resources/humanistic approach/HumanisticMediationTransormativeJour-
ney.pdf.
140. See JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW AP-
PROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
141. See Cheryl Picard & Marnie Jull, Learning Through Deepening Conversa-
tions: A Key Strategy of Insight Mediation, 29 CONFLICT REsOL. Q. 151, 152 (2011).
142. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA-
TION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 46, 217-18 (Rev. ed. 2005)
(describing transformative theory as based on assisting parties to transform their
conflict interaction through empowerment and recognition, rather than focusing on
achieving settlement); Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope, Changing the
Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principles and Practice of Transformative Media-
tion, 3 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 67, 77 (2002) ("In the transformative mediation pro-
cess, parties can recapture their sense of competence and connection, reverse the
negative conflict cycle, re-establish a constructive (or at least neutral) interaction and
move forward on a positive footing, with the mediator's help"); Joseph Folger, Har-
mony and Transformative Mediation Practice: Sustaining Ideological Differences in
Purpose and Practice, 84 N.D. L. Rev. 823, 844-48 (2008) (articulating four types of
transformative mediation techniques that "characterize the essential elements of
transformative interventions": allowing parties to control process, mediator's mainte-
nance of non-directive role, encouraging parties' expression and examination of differ-
ences, and supporting parties' transformations toward enlightenment and self-
empowerment); Tina Nabatchi & Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Transformative Mediation
in the USPS Redress Program: Observations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 399, 401-02 (2001) (examining transformative mediation in employment
setting as viable alternative to traditional adversarial-based process and as vehicle
for parties to seize greater control over their own conflicts and learn how to effectively
manage future conflicts). Note, however, that some commentators have speculated
that the definition of mediation included in enabling legislation may exclude the
transformative model of mediation because it is not focused on settlement. See Si-
meon H. Baum, Lessons from Russian Mediators, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2010,
supra note 17, at 449-51.
143. David Burt, DuPont Corporate Counsel, has observed approvingly that medi-
ation "has an intimacy foreign to adversarial methods. There is less separating the
leaders and lawyers from their counterparty at mediation than in any other phase of
formalized dispute resolution." David H. Burt, Inside Counsel as Sophisticated Users,
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2010, supra note 17, at 418, 420.
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even the parties) beforehand to learn about the dynamics of the dis-
pute and interests of the parties that will be relevant in customizing
the process.' 44 Mediators using most of these models may also use
caucuses (or ex parte meetings), but primarily to supplement or assist
the productivity of the parties'joint negotiations. Mediators may use
caucuses for a variety of purposes-e.g., providing parties with the
opportunity to "cool off' or express themselves on sensitive topics, of-
fering an empathetic ear, helping parties consider how they can par-
ticipate or negotiate more effectively in the joint session, encouraging
parties to discuss the weaknesses of their position, or helping parties
consider the consequences of the solution that appears to be the most
likely candidate for settlement. All of these interventions will be de-
signed to enhance the parties' autonomy and control of the
negotiation.
There is another quite different cluster of mediation models,
however. These are described as "evaluative,"145 "directive,"146 fo-
cused on bargaining 147 and facilitating distributive outcomes.
14s
144. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 928; ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION, TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION QUALITY: FINAL REPORT APRIL 2006 -
FEBRUARY 2008 10 (Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Disp. Resol. Ed., 2008) [hereinafter ABA
TASK FORCE]; FRIEDMAN & HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 137, at 17-40 (2009) (describing
pre-mediation discussion of dynamics involved in a dispute, which assisted the parties
in selecting the appropriate model of mediation); see also John M. Barkett, Avoiding
the Costs of International Commercial Arbitration: Is Mediation the Solution?, in CON-
TEMPORARY ISSUES 2010, supra note 17, at 367, 380-81 (describing the ICDR media-
tion rules, which provide the mediator with right to require shared or confidential
pre-mediation submissions, as well as the CPR European Mediation Rules, which pro-
vide for confidential pre-mediation submission and mediator's authority to require
exchange of written statements and other materials); Susskind, Consensus Building
and ADR, supra note 65, at 361, 364 (describing the convening and conflict assess-
ment functions in facility siting cases, and mediators' role in recommending stake-
holders to be included in the process as well as whether the process should move to a
"problem-solving stage").
145. See Riskin, supra note 135, at 44-45 (noting that although evaluative ap-
proach may make it easier for parties to reach resolution because evaluative mediator
provides recommendations and assessments, thereby removing some of parties' deci-
sion-making burdens, the mediator's evaluations may impede parties' ability to ap-
preciate their own and each other's positions and make the process more
antagonistic).
146. See Riskin, supra note 136, at 30 (defining term directive as "almost any con-
duct by which the mediator directs the mediation process, or the participants, toward
a particular procedure or perspective or outcome") (emphasis in original).
147. See Silbey & Merry, supra note 138, at 19-20 (describing bargaining style
mediation as rigid process driven by mediators who "claim authority as professionals
with expertise in process, law, and the court system" and blatantly control proceed-
ings, "ignoring emotional demands and concentrating on demands that can be traded
off," often preferring caucuses over direct party communication and advising parties
of "the benefits of a settlement of any kind").
Spring 2013]
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
Again, mediators are likely to engage in substantial pre-mediation
work. In this second set of models, though, the mediators play a more
central role, and the focus is on the use of caucus rather than joint
sessions. 149 If the mediator begins with a joint session, he will listen
to initial presentations, generally made by the lawyers, and then
quickly shift the focus to analysis of the case and his or her provision
of indirect or direct advice to the parties and their lawyers. Most, if
not all, of this analysis and advice will occur in caucus. Notice that
this cluster of models of mediation begins to sound much like the be-
havior of a conciliator shuttling back and forth between the parties
and "reality testing" with questions, information, and even propos-
als, 150 or an ICC Review Board providing informal assistance to the
parties,151 or even an arbitrator in a non-binding procedure. 152
Besides the differences in mediator role and "look" among these
different models, they also vary in their substantive focus. Mediation
is generally described as an interest-based process while arbitration
is described as rights-based. Thus, mediation is automatically under-
stood as encouraging the discussion of extra-legal interests to permit
the development of "integrative solutions.' 53 As this discussion of
the different models of mediation should make apparent, however,
148. RISKIN ET AL., supra note 127, at 311-24; CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, ET AL.,
MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND ETHics 279-86 (2006).
149. Usually, the focus is also on law-related issues, though this issue orientation
is not inevitable. See Riskin, supra note 135, at 24; Riskin, supra note 136, at 23; See
Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 928.
150. See also Barkett, supra note 144, at 387-88 (describing the authorization of
evaluative interventions, including case evaluations and settlement recommenda-
tions, in the ICDR Mediation Rules, CPR European Mediation Procedure, and UNCI-
TRAL Conciliation Rules).
151. See Wolrich, supra note 23, at 468 (describing a process that involves many
caucuses, to permit the members of the Dispute Board to learn enough information to
enable them to provide informed advice to the parties on the issues in dispute).
152. See Salacuse, supra note 9, at 35 (equating conciliation and non-binding arbi-
tration); see also Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social
Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 871, 877 (1997)
(equating courts' non-binding arbitration programs with mediation). Sometimes, the
definition of conciliation seems as contested as that of mediation. See Complementary
Use, supra note 9, at 14-21; CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDI-
ATION IN INTERNATIONAL BusINEss 273 (Julian Lew ed., 1st ed. 1996); see also Wolrich,
supra note 23, at 473 (describing ICC's Dispute Review Board's procedures as involv-
ing a hearing, followed by the Board's recommendation; if the recommendation is not
rejected by the parties, it then represents a binding contract). See e.g. S.I. Strong,
Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. 1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitra-
tion and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. _ (forth-
coming 2013).
153. See generally MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 127, at 270-296; RiSIUN ET
AL., supra note 127, 184-86 (4th ed. 2009).
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reality presents a more nuanced picture. 154 Much court-connected
and court-oriented civil mediation in the U.S. focuses primarily on
legal and litigation analysis. In the second cluster of mediation mod-
els, for example, mediators' analysis and advice generally is focused
on helping the parties to be sufficiently realistic regarding their op-
tions in civil litigation (or administrative adjudication) and to guide
them toward a resolution generally consistent with those options.
There likely are multiple reasons for this legal and litigation-oriented
focus: the mediation is occurring in the shadow of the courthouse; the
lawyers generally select the mediators; 15 5 the mediators tend to be
lawyers themselves, with relevant substantive expertise;1 5 6 the law-
yers tend to dominate the discussion in mediation; 5 7 the parties may
be unable or unwilling to engage in the sort of disclosure and discus-
sion likely to lead to integrative solutions;' 58 and the parties may
prefer to focus on the law as a means to reach resolution.
15 9
Interestingly, there are indications that sophisticated users of
commercial mediation prefer mediators and mediation sessions that
can uncover and use the parties' extra-legal interests and, at the
same time, engage the lawyers and parties in a thoughtful discussion
154. Besides the differences in substantive focus in mediation, there are similar
differences in arbitration. In some industry contexts, for example, arbitration can be
explicitly interest-based rather than rights-based "Interest arbitration" is used in the
labor context, to arrive at collective bargaining agreements. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY
WITH DAVID G. CARNEVALE, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 264-65 (3d ed.
2001); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 127, at 400-01.
155. See Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of
Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 434
(2002); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in
Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. 473, 524 (2002).
156. See McAdoo, supra note 155, at 434.
157. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's
Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 802-03 (2001) (citing to studies
showing lawyers' domination of mediation sessions); Roselle L. Wissler, Representa-
tion in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical Research, 37 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
419, 444-45, 449-50 (2010) (comparing parties' and lawyers' level of participation in
mediation sessions, as well as parties' "sense of voice").
158. See Nancy A. Welsh, You've Got Your Mother's Laugh: What Bankruptcy Me-
diation Can Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17
AM. BANKE. INST. L. REV. 427 (2009).
159. See id. at 438 (describing why so much mediation is focused on analysis of law
and litigation); Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 83, at 805-06; Welsh, Thinning Vi-
sion, supra note 122, at 26-27; Robert Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolu-
tion and the Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 27, 55 (2002)
(urging that parties who seek access to the courts also seek the application of legal
norms).
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of the relevant law and litigation realities. 160 Mediation certainly
has the potential to house both functions, without one dominating or
marginalizing the other. Experience in the U.S. generally suggests
that the most effective court-connected mediators are those who can
combine elements of all of the mediation models described supra,
with mediators thoroughly preparing themselves and facilitating the
preparation of the disputants and their lawyers, seeking to under-
stand important interests and develop trust, listening carefully and
effectively, asking parties to explore or justify their assumptions and
predictions regarding legal outcomes, carefully challenging unrealis-
tic assumptions and helping parties to be more realistic, offering face-
saving strategies, and assisting disputants and lawyers to develop re-
sponsive, realistic solutions. 161 In other words, this presumptively
interest-based process is most likely to be helpful when it includes
both legal analysis and probing for interests. Note, however, that the
process still presumes that no agreement will occur without the par-
ties' voluntary assent.
160. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 928; Welsh, Stepping Back, supra
note 81, at 573, 671; ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 144, at 12-13, 17, 19 (recom-
mending further study of analytical techniques in mediation); Kenneth Kressel, The
Strategic Style in Mediation, 24 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 251, 252-3 (2007); Cheryl Picard,
Exploring Integrative Framework for Understanding Mediation 21 CONFLICT RESOL.
Q. 295, 309 (2004) (arguing for a vision of mediation that integrates various theories).
161. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 928; Welsh, Stepping Back, supra
note 81, at 573, 671; ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 144, at 12-13,
17, 19 (noting the importance of mediator's involvement in preparation; also recom-
mending further study of analytical techniques in mediation); Kressel, supra note
160, at 252-53; Picard, supra note 160, at 307-9 (arguing for a vision of mediation that
integrates various theories); A. Timothy Martin, International Mediation: An Evolv-
ing Market, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2010, supra note 17, at 410, 410 (describing
results of CEDR Audit, including showing that one of the primary factors facilitating
settlement in mediation is parties' preparation). This article does not address the use
of a single neutral to facilitate negotiation and, if necessary, serve as arbitrator. Re-
gardless of whether the settlement phase of such a process is called mediation or is
simply incorporated into arbitration, it will be essential to consider the potential neg-
ative effects of ex parte proceedings during the settlement phase. See Welsh, Stien-
stra & McAdoo, supra note 83 (discussing potential perceptions of coercion, partiality
and lack of even-handedness when the presiding judge also facilitates settlement ses-
sions). Some organizations have adopted rules to prevent or mitigate these effects.
See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration: The Challenge
of Judicial Review, 5 PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION (forthcoming 2013)
(describing the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, which permits med-arb with a sin-
gle neutral, but requires the parties' consent and, if the parties proceed to arbitration,
the neutral's disclosure of any confidential information learned during mediation that
the neutral considers "material to the arbitral proceedings"); see also CEDR Rules for
Facilitation of Settlement in International Arbitration, Article 5.2.1-5.2.2 ("The Arbi-
tral Tribunal shall not... meet with any Party without all other Parties being present;
or obtain information from any Party which is not shared with the other Parties.").
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From a dispute system design perspective, mediation has the po-
tential to be unique-and meaningfully different from arbitration-
because it offers a lower-cost alternative that encourages communica-
tion and negotiation between the parties and explicitly includes con-
sideration of parties' interests as a key element in resolving disputes.
As the discussion of different models of mediation reveals, however,
mediation's ability to realize this potential will depend upon the par-
ticular model that is integrated.
Importantly, even this Article's recounting of the important vari-
ations among mediation models is likely to be incomplete, because it
reflects the cultural expectations of a common law, adversarial sys-
tem. Imagine that "mediation" is the name that has been given to
parties' informal meetings with judges, or to disputants' informal
meetings with village or community elders, in which the judges or
elders will have the power to make decisions that will be enforced by
the law or community. 162 It will be difficult to discern (or believe in)
a conceptual distinction, in terms of outcome control, between this
form of "mediation" and binding arbitration. Similarly, when judicial
"adjudication" looks like a meeting, as it does in some civil law and
inquisitorial systems, it may be difficult to explain how the "look" of
the "adjudicative" process of arbitration should be expected to differ
from mediation in terms of formality and procedural structure. The
existence of these sorts of legal-cultural idiosyncrasies counsels that
if mediation is added to the investment context, rules should clarify
the models that may be used, including their locus of outcome con-
trol, 16 3 their "look," and the issues and norms that will be
considered.164
162. See Elsing, supra note 59, at 314-17 (expressing preference for proactive arbi-
trators reflecting a civil law approach, also referenced as "town elder" or "arbitrator"
with "back bone"); see also Baum, supra note 142, at 443 (referencing Russian parties'
use of "vigilante mediation" or autoritat, with mob boss serving as mediator).
163. See Welsh, Hollow Promise, supra note 122, at 179 (exploring the nuances of
parties' control over outcomes).
164. There may also be a need to overcome prejudices against the approaches that
characterize foreign litigation systems, perhaps especially the systems of dominant
nations. See, e.g., A. Timothy Martin, International Mediation: An Evolving Market,
in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs 2010, supra note 17, at 415, 415 (observing that there may
be suspicion of a process originating in the U.S. or U.K.). See also STEPHEN W.
SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 6-8 (2009)
(explaining many former colonies' suspicion and rejection of the multilateral invest-
ment treaty schemes proposed by the developed countries that had been colonial pow-
ers), Mary Helen Mourra, The Conflicts and Controversies in Latin American Treaty-
Based Disputes, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE CONTRO-
VERSIES AND CONFLICTS 5-10, 15-17 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed. 2008) (regarding co-
lonial hesitation and development of the Calvo Doctrine).
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3. Recommended "Default" Model of Mediation for the
Investor-State Context
Arguably, at least, the aim of mediation in the investment con-
text should be enhancing parties' ability to communicate, inform, and
negotiate directly with each other. After all, it will be important for
the parties to maintain or improve ongoing relationships, collaborate
on the implementation of any agreement, and acknowledge volatile
political situations (often accompanied by difficult emotions) to en-
able representatives (and their constituencies) to embrace good solu-
tions, even if they are not everyone's preferred solutions. All of these
factors suggest the value of a "default" model of mediation that be-
gins with facilitative or elicitive interventions and a focus on inter-
ests. Such a model should be preceded by careful preparation.
Importantly, however, this model of mediation should also be supple-
mented as necessary with evaluative or directive interventions and
consideration of legal rights and norms. As we have discussed supra,
it is the combination of these interventions that is the hallmark of
effective mediators. A process that begins facilitatively should enable
the parties' "mutual consideration"' 65 of each other's perspectives
and underlying needs. In other words, it should facilitate the parties'
ability to engage in a procedurally just process with each other. In-
vestors and states will need sufficient opportunity to speak and be
heard, but also to listen to each other, reflect upon what was said,
demonstrate that they have listened to each other, and also make
meaningful movement toward resolution.
166
This recommendation assumes that states and investors need ac-
cess to mediation because they currently have only three other proce-
dures available to them-negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration-
165. Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 81, at 606.
166. Id. at 620-626. But see Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 89, at 477-79. One of
the authors and Professor Leonard Riskin have previously proposed a different "de-
fault" model for court-connected and court-oriented mediation. That model is pre-
sumptively law-and-litigation-focused, though it also provides for explicit
consultation with the parties (or clients) so that they can elect to discuss and try to
resolve issues that are broader, or extra-legal. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113.
The default model of mediation proposed there is different from the proposal in this
Article due to the differences in assumptions regarding needs and objectives. Here,
there is the assumption that investors and states will need to maintain and even
improve ongoing relationships, collaborate on the implementation of solutions, and
find a means to acknowledge volatile political situations. For many of the non-family
civil matters that are mediated in courts in the U.S., there will be no ongoing relation-
ship between the parties and settlement of the lawsuit will involve only a one-time
payment of money.
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to resolve their disputes. 167 The "default" mediation model that is
presumptively facilitative and interest-based therefore offers some-
thing new and useful. First, of course, it provides a third party to
assist the parties' negotiations; this differentiates it from negotiation.
Second, its focus is on facilitating the parties' communication, infor-
mation-sharing and negotiation, thus placing it within the "facili-
tated" category of processes, while conciliation and binding
arbitration fit into the "advisory" and "imposed" categories, respec-
tively. Finally, this model of mediation provides an explicit opportu-
nity to identify and focus on the discussion of interests, while
conciliation and arbitration presumptively focus on rights. As a "de-
fault," parties may elect to depart from this model, but they must do
so explicitly and agree upon such a departure.
4. The Relationship Between the "Default" Model and States'
Preventative Initiatives
A few states have already expanded the continuum of options
available in the investor-state context. They have established new
structures and procedures designed to encourage early communica-
tion and information sharing between states and investors, thus
preventing disputes or resolving them very early in their evolution.
Examples include Peru's coordination and response system, including
its Special Commission, and Colombia's lead agency model. 168 Peru's
coordination and response system places certain obligations on any
company operating in Peru if disputes arising from its operations
could be governed by international arbitration guidelines, such as
those contained in the ICSID Convention. 169 Peru's Ministry of Eco-
nomic and Finance is responsible for collecting information regarding
all parties who could be involved in such an arbitration. In this way,
the Ministry can consolidate all available information regarding a
167. The parties could authorize arbitrators to engage in "interest arbitration,"
though, to help them arrive at a new contractual arrangement that includes terms
designed to resolve past disputes. See KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 154, at
94-95. Of course, interest arbitration, like any adjudicative process, has the potential
to produce unanticipated and unwelcome results. This is less likely to occur, however,
if states and investors have confidence in the pool of arbitrators available for the arbi-
tration process.
168. See INVESTOR-STATE DISPuTES, supra note 7, at 49, 68.
169. The goals of the system are to: 1) effectively provide information to local gov-
ernments when the national government enters into a BIT of any sort; 2) provide an
efficient means for the local governments to report issues with companies operating in
Peru to the national government; and 3) provide a gateway for the foreign investors to
have centralized contact with the national government. See INVESTOR-STATE Dis-
PUTEs, supra note 7 at 69-70.
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dispute and facilitate more effective and efficient settlement negotia-
tions. Peru credits its new system with averting 300 potential arbi-
tration proceedings.
170
Similarly, Colombia's government has set up a lead agency
model which makes one central agency responsible for every step of
the investor relationship and arbitration process, from gathering and
reporting information, transmitting information to the proper agen-
cies within the government for analysis, and representing the govern-
ment in negotiations with investors and, if necessary, in the
arbitration process. Most importantly for purposes of this Article, as
the governmental agency responsible for the relationship with the in-
vestor and information-gathering, the lead agency facilitates discus-
sions and settlement if disputes arise between the investor and other
entities within the Colombian government. These procedures may fit
into the preventative, negotiated, facilitated, fact-finding or advisory
categories, depending upon when and how they are implemented and
the outcomes they tend to produce. 171 Indeed, and as specifically
noted in Columbia, the state officials leading these efforts have the
potential to serve as "quasi-mediators," meeting many of the needs
that would otherwise fall to third party mediators using the pre-
sumptively facilitative or elicitive models described supra. Under
these circumstances, there may be less need for the integration of a
new process named "mediation."
Trust, however, is the key. If investors perceive these agency
quasi-mediators as biased against them or biased toward the govern-
ment-thus insufficiently trustworthy, insufficiently knowledgeable,
insufficiently even-handed or neutral, 72 or insufficiently open-
minded-then investors are unlikely to perceive their processes or
170. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 69.
171. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 78, at 32-33 (stating reasons USPS chose not
to permit evaluation by mediators); JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTI-
TIONER: ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES 190 (2000) (urging that
intervenors' claims of neutrality frequently work to the disadvantage of the less
powerful).
172. See Tyler, Rule of Law, supra note 85, at 679-80 (asserting, based on empiri-
cal evidence, that people's deference to courts and police is based on issues related to
procedural justice and trust-e.g., decisions based on facts, consistent application of
rules, lack of prejudice and bias, respect for people's rights and respect for them a
people-not the general performance of such authorities or their decisions). See
Tyler, Psychological Models, supra note 85, at 852; De Cremer, supra note 98, at 640;
Markell, supra note 98, at 228-29.
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outcomes as fair.1 73 In other words, a state-run process could be per-
ceived as immediately subject to political and social pressures. Par-
ticularly if the process's use is required, its suspected partiality will
reduce its likely attractiveness and long-term effectiveness.
Under these circumstances, investors are more likely to perceive
a mediation process involving an outside and independent mediator
as preferable in terms of its procedural justice. Even the use of an
outside mediator, however, does not guarantee that investors will
perceive the process as sufficiently even-handed, especially if a state
agency makes repeated use of a particular outside mediator who is
heavily reliant on these referrals. A foreign investor is likely to be-
come concerned about such a mediator's ability to remain sufficiently
neutral over time.174 At the very least, however, providing investors
with the affordable and easily-accessible option of using a jointly-se-
lected, independent, outside mediator may incentivize the agency to
make its own processes appear, and actually be, sufficiently even-
handed in order to attract and maintain foreign investment. 17
5
173. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 112, at 416-27; Sean Nolon, Sec-
ond Best Practices?: Addressing Mediation's Definitional Problems in Environmental
Siting Disputes, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 69 (2012) (examining potential conflicts of interest
for interested parties playing the role of "quasi-mediators" in the resolution of siting
disputes).
174. See Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 81 at 666 (observing that parents no-
ticed special familiarity between mediator and school officials in special education
mediation; also observing that mediator's inclusion on the special education media-
tion roster was more likely for those applicants with experience in education; experi-
ence as a parent of a child with special needs was not considered helpful); Hiram E.
Chodosh, The Eighteenth Camel: Mediating Mediation Reform in India, 9 GER. L. J.
251, 280 (2008) (observing that "liln well developed systems, mediators chosen by re-
peat players have to counter the perception and leanings of any favoritism against
single players" but also noting that "[iun newly developing processes, where trust be-
tween the parties and the mediator is critical and may be frequently based on a prior
relationship, it may be harder to insist on norms of social neutrality"); see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?:
Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19, 32-37, 46-47 (1999); James
R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smdagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values
Beyond Self Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 77
(2004); Welsh, Contender, supra note 81, at 1168-72.
175. See, e.g., About REDRESS, USPS, Oct. 28, 2012, http://about.usps.com/what-
we-are-doinglredress/about.htm [hereinafter USPS REDRESS] (describing the USPS
REDRESS mediation program as an alternative to the internal EEO process); see also
Maurits Barendrecht, Courts, Competition and Innovation, in TILBURG LAW SCHOOL
LEGAL STUDIEs RESEARCH PAPER SERIEs No. 003, 11-12 (2012) (listing areas requiring
improvement by courts that invite litigants to shop for other, more innovative, fo-
rums); Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change,
2007 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 42 (2007) (observing that an "institutional intermediary," un-
like an outside mediator, can be "poised to integrate individual conflict resolution and
systemic improvement").
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B. Mediation Referral Schemes
As we contemplate whether and how to integrate mediation into
the investment treaty context, another key question will be whether
the use of mediation should be wholly voluntary or structured as a
compulsory stop on the way to arbitration. Increasingly, commercial
contracts in the U.S. provide for mediation as one step of several in a
dispute resolution clause. 176 On occasion, one party will go to court
to force the other party to mediate. 177 Courts in the U.S. handle
these requests differently. Some courts enforce mediation as a con-
tract term.178 Other courts look to the Federal Arbitration Act for
guidance to enforce the mediation clause.1 79 Still other courts assess
176. See Kathleen M. Scanlon & Harpreet K. Mann, A Guide to Multi-Step Dispute
Resolution Clauses, in 20 ALT. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 2 (2002); Robert N. Dobbins,
The Layered Dispute Resolution Clause: From Boilerplate to Business Opportunity, 1
HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 161, 166-71 (2005); CPR Model Clauses and Sample Language,
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, Oct. 28, 2012, https://www.cpradr.org/Re-
sources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/635/CPR-Model-Clauses-and-Sample-Lan-
guage.aspx; S.I. Strong, Arbitration and the Republic of Colombia: Commercial,
Comparative and Constitutional Concerns from a U.S. Perspective, 22 DUKE J. CoMP.
& INT'L L. 47, 82 (2011).
177. In re Atl. Pipe, 304 F. 3d.135, 147 (1st Cir. 2002).
178. See Nancy A. Welsh, Arbitration and Beyond: Avoiding Pitfalls in Drafting
Dispute Resolution Clauses in Employment Contracts, 1 J. ALT. DIrp. RESOL. EMP. 35,
41 (1999) [hereinafter Arbitration and Beyond]; Tattoo Art, Inc. v. Tat Int'l, LLC, 711
F. Supp. 2d 645, 650 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("[Tlhe mediation provision must be interpreted
in accordance with Virginia contract principles. The plain language of the mediation
provision unambiguously shows that the parties elected not to be subject to this
Court's jurisdiction, at least with respect to any dispute stemming from the Licensing
Agreement, until one of the parties either requests mediation and that request is de-
nied or mediation commences and fails."); Vanum Constr. Co. v. Magnum Block, LLC,
245 P.3d 1069, 1075 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) ("(1) mediation clauses should generally be
construed to require a plaintiff to pursue mediation before filing a claim, even in the
absence of explicit language requiring that mediation precede litigation; (2) the pur-
pose of a mediation clause is fully served only if mediation precedes litigation; and (3)
if a plaintiff fails to comply with a mediation clause before filing a claim in court, the
plaintiffs claim may be dismissed.").
179. See Arbitration and Beyond, supra note 178, at 41; Sekisui Ta Indus., LLC v.
Quality Tape Supply, Inc., No. DKC-08-2634, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61983, at *11-12
(D. Md. Jul. 17, 2009) ("Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has not con-
cluded that mediation is outside the scope of the FAA. In fact, as indicated above,
Maryland state and federal courts have suggested that mediation does fall under the
provisions of the FAA."); Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int'l, Inc., 524
F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Thus, when there is a dispute about whether any
particular dispute resolution method chosen in a contract is FAA arbitration, we will
look for the "common incidents" of "classic arbitration," including (i) an independent
adjudicator, (ii) who applies substantive legal standards (i.e. the parties' agreement
and background contract law), (iii) considers evidence and argument (however for-
mally or informally) from each party, and (iv) renders a decision that purports to re-
solve the rights and duties of the parties, typically by awarding damages or equitable
relief."); Gate Precast Co. v. Kenwood Towne Place, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-00113, 2009
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whether mediation is likely to be fruitful, particularly in light of one
party's apparent reluctance to mediate.180 Courts using this last ap-
proach generally have been less likely to enforce mediation clauses,
in light of one of the parties' opposition to the process, in much the
same way that some arbitral panels have not enforced the cooling off
periods that precede submission of a dispute to investment treaty
arbitration.1 8 .
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100579, at *12-13 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2009) (The explicit terms of 9
U.S.C. § 3 refer to "arbitration" as opposed to the broader term "dispute resolutions
procedure." Should any Act govern this question, it is rather the Uniform Mediation
Act, which as Plaintiff notes, contains no mandatory enforcement provision. Media-
tion is not the same as arbitration, due to its non-binding nature.").
180. See Arbitration and Beyond, supra note 178, at 41; see also, Peter Salem, The
Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the End for
Mandatory Mediation? 47 FAm. CT. REV. 371, 371-88 (2009) (comparing the tiered
versus triage approach in ordering parties to family mediation, and urging adoption of
triage approach to make use of mediation more likely to be fruitful), cited in Welsh,
supra note 158, at 454 n. 175; Tattoo Art, Inc. 711 F. Supp. 2d at 652 ("Arguably,
dismissing the instant lawsuit may ultimately prove inefficient and futile because the
parties are not required to actually resolve the dispute through mediation. As men-
tioned above, the parties are merely required to request mediation prior to initiating
litigation.")
181. See Arbitration and Beyond, supra note 178, at 41; Christoph Schreuer,
Calvo's Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration, 4
LAw & PRAc. OF INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1, 3-5 (2005) (Discussing the non-application
of treaty provisions requiring the use of local courts for a certain period of time before
seeking ICSID jurisdiction. "The shorter periods look quite unrealistic and make one
wonder if the drafters seriously expected that a settlement might be achieved in this
way. Even the longer periods are somewhat optimistic and look more like a cooling off
period than a serious attempt to settle the dispute domestically."); Siemans A.G. v.
The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, I 32-
110 (Aug.3, 2004) https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC5OSEn&caseId=C7 (Rejecting the applica-
tion of an 18-month period for resort to national courts due to the petitioner's invoca-
tion of a Most Favoured Nation clause in the applicable Bilateral Investment Treaty,
claiming that such a condition is not imposed by Argentina under Chile-Argentina
BIT, despite its presence in the Germany-Argentina BIT.); Emilio Agustfn Maffezini
v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on Ob-
jections to Jurisdiction, 991 19-64 (Jan.25, 2000) https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC565_En&case
Id=C163 (Rejecting Spain's challenge to jurisdiction on the basis that Spain did not
condition its consent to ICSID jurisdiction on the requirement that the investor com-
ply with the six-month waiting period and subsequent 18-month period of local juris-
diction before submitting the case to an ICSID tribunal. Because the investor invoked
the treaty's Most Favoured Nation clause, the investor could operate under the condi-
tions of more favorable treaties signed by Spain that do not have such waiting peri-
ods.). But see Richard Deutsch, An 1CSID Tribunal Denies Jurisdiction for Failure to
Satisfy BIT's "Cooling-Off" Period: Further Evidence of a Sea Change in Investor-State
Arbitration or a Meaningless Ripple? 33 HoUs. J. IN''L L. 589, 592-93 (2011) (citing
the Tribunal's decision in Murphy Exploration and Production Company Interna-
tional v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/4, Award on Jurisdiction, 1 5,
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Meanwhile, many courts in the U.S., especially state courts, have
adopted compulsory mediation programs for the resolution of non-
family civil cases (e.g., contract, property damage, personal injury,
employment, etc.).18 2  In general, such adoptions occurred after
courts found that their purely voluntary programs were receiving lit-
tle usage 83 while compulsory mediation enjoyed very substantial
settlement rates, even if they were not quite as high as those pro-
duced by parties' purely voluntary use of the process.18 4 There are
10-12 (Dec. 15, 2010), in which the Tribunal denied jurisdiction because the investor
did not satisfy the negotiation requirements of the Ecuador-U.S. BIT).
182. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117 (generally describing state and federal
courts adoption of mediation and other ADR programs for the resolution of civil non-
family disputes). See also Donna Stienstra, ADR in the Federal District Courts: An
Initial Report (Federal Judicial Center, 2011) available at http://www.fc.gov/publid
pdf.nsf/lookup/adr20ll.pdf/$file/adr2Oll.pdf. Federal and state agencies in the U.S.
have also adopted variations of mandatory mediation. And outside the U.S., some
countries have made (or attempted to make) mediation a condition precedent to filing
lawsuits. Italy is a prime example of this. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Importance of
Context in Comparing the Worldwide Institutionalization of Court-Connected Media-
tion, in ADR IN BUSINESS: PRACTICE AND ISSUES ACROSS COUNTRIES AND CULTURES,
VOLUME II 119 (Arnold Ingen-Housz, ed., 2011); Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Is Europe
Headed Down the Primrose Path with Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 981, 998-1006 (2012) (describing the experiences of other nations in man-
dating mediation).
183. See Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys' Discussion and Use of ADR, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 459, 462 n. 7 (2004); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional
Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice,
47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 981-83 (2000) (research suggesting low voluntary usage of
ADR). Low usage rates are not inevitable. Some courts have been quite successful in
promoting voluntary use of their mediation programs. See, e.g., McAdoo & Welsh,
supra note 117, at 15 (regarding voluntary mediation program of the Federal District
Court of the Western District of Michigan).
184. See Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 90, at 697 (reporting
that a slight majority of studies found no difference in settlement rates between
mandatory and voluntary use, but some found greater likelihood of settlement with
voluntary use); Heather Anderson & Ron Pi, Judicial Council of California, Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts, Evaluation of the Early Mediation Pilot Programs 37-38
(2004) (reporting that in pilot study of five court-annexed civil mediation programs in
California, mediated settlement rate was higher for voluntary than mandatory pro-
grams but also noting that "the mediation referral and settlement rates in most pro-
grams are actually quite similar to each other" and urging that mandatory mediation
may achieve higher resolution if party preferences are sought and considered, while
voluntary mediation may achieve higher use if courts encourage use of process and
offer a financial incentive; settlement rate of 49% in Los Angeles was considerably
lower than the overall average of 58%). See also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Settlement of Inves-
tor-State Disputes through Mediation - Preliminary Remarks on Processes, Problems
and Prospects, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AwARDS AGAINST SOVEREIGNS 73, 75 n.
13 (Doak Bishop ed., 2009) (listing several studies regarding commercial mediation
reporting settlement rates in excess of 80%); Martin, supra note 161, at 409 (reporting
the settlement rates of mediations conducted by CEDR (89% settling at or within a
short time of mediation), ICDR (85% within a few weeks or at mediation), ICC (80% if
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obvious parallels to the current situation in the investment treaty
context. Even though some treaties explicitly invite the use of negoti-
ation and other consensual processes before submitting a dispute to
arbitration-and parties settle-there is actually little use of media-
tion or conciliation.1
8 5
1. Scope of Compulsory Mediation
But "mandating mediation" can mean many-and very differ-
ent-things. 8 6 First, courts' mediation mandate may apply to many
cases, or only a few. Some courts, for example, order all cases into
mediation. Others use a substantive screen for their compulsory pro-
grams, identifying only particular types of lawsuits to go to media-
tion, i.e., usually lawsuits that seem most likely to involve important
extra-legal issues that cannot be fully resolved by a court. Other
courts may require all civil lawsuits to go to mediation, but then will
exempt particular types of cases. All of these represent "categori-
cal"-and institutionally-mandated-referrals to mediation. On the
other hand, some courts provide individual judges or court adminis-
trators with the discretion to order mediation on an ad hoc basis.
These are described as "discretionary" referrals.' 8 7 Research has
shown, however, that if judges utilize referrals frequently enough, re-
peat players are likely to perceive these discretionary referrals as de
facto categorical referrals to mediation. 188 Despite their differences
file transferred to mediation)); James A. Wall & Timothy C. Dunne, Mediation Re-
search: A Current Review, 28 NEGOT. J. 217 (2012) (summarizing mediation research
results, including those showing settlement rates of 60% to 80% in studies conducted
before 1990 through the present); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Implementation of Court-An-
nexed Environmental Mediation: The District of Oregon Pilot Project, 17 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 581-82 (2002) (reporting on case management of environmental
cases and outcomes). But see Burt, supra note 61, at 418 n. 1, 424 (describing court-
ordered mediation in the U.S. as "nearly worthless" and "oxymoronic").
185. See INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 7, at xxi-xxvii; INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTES II, supra note 1 at xv; see also U.S. DEP'T Of STATE, MODEL BIT (2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/l17601.pdf (referencing the
potential to use consensual processes before going to arbitration). But see Deutsch,
supra note 181, at 594, 603.
186. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117, at 10-11 (describing different mandatory
schemes in state and federal courts in the U.S.).
187. Frank Sander, et al., Judicial (Mis) Use ofADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L. REV.
885, 885-86 (1996), cited in Dorcas Quek, Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Ex-
amining the Feasibility of Implementing A Court-Mandated Mediation Program, 11
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 480-81 (2010); see also McAdoo, supra note 111, at
358-60 (describing approaches used by various state appellate court administrators in
screening to determine whether to order parties into appellate mediation).
188. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 63, at 408 (noting that Minnesota judges'
"routine ordering of ADR was a key factor motivating attorneys to select mediation");
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in the scope of the cases to which they apply, all of these options re-
present compulsory referral schemes.
2. Degree of Intrusiveness of Compulsory Elements
Courts in the U.S. have also experimented with the level of intru-
siveness of the obligations being imposed upon parties. In some
courts, parties are required only to consider the use of mediation (and
other dispute resolution options) on their own and submit a document
to the court that responds to the court's questions regarding the ap-
propriateness of the process.18 9 Other courts require parties to ex-
plore the potential use of mediation by attending a case conference at
which mediation will be discussed. Sometimes, these conferences
transform into initial mediation sessions. Still other courts explicitly
require the parties to begin mediation by attending an initial orienta-
tion or first mediation session. 190 After the parties have completed
this obligation and thus have had the opportunity to develop their
perceptions of the mediation process and the particular mediator's
capacities, they may determine whether they wish to continue with
the process. Last, of course, many courts in the U.S. require the par-
ties to participate in an entire mediation process. In general, though,
McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 155, at 506, 537 (2002) (reporting that one third of
lawyers not using ADR made that choice because judges were not ordering or encour-
aging it; therefore encouraging judges to be more proactive); see also Bobbi McAdoo,
All Rise, the Court is in Session: What Judges Say About Court-Connected Mediation,
22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 377, 393-404 (2007) (reporting research regarding
factors motivating judges to order the use of mediation).
189. See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Does ADR Really Have A Place on the
Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 376, 380-81 (1997)
(describing mandatory consideration of ADR); Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo, Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Minnesota - An Update on Rule 114, in COURT-
ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED STATE AND FEDERAL PRO-
GRAMS 203, 206-207 (Edward Bergman & John Bickerman, eds., 1998) (describing
mandatory consideration under Rule 114); see also Nancy A. Welsh, The Future of
Mediation: Court-Connected Mediation in the U.S. and the Netherlands Compared, 1
FORUM VOOR CONFLICT MGMT. 19, 21 (2007) (noting some "Dutch judges in the pilot
sites ... distributed a 'self test' to all parties to encourage them to consider whether
mediation might be appropriate for their case."); Baum, supra note 142, at 356-59
(describing Russian legislation which mandates mediation, but also includes a 30-day
default provision, which allows parties to avoid mediation by failing to pursue it. This
essentially guts the compulsory element of the statute; the default provision does not
apply to judicial or arbitral facilitation of settlement).
190. See Coe, supra note 22, at 350 (proposing settlement attempt as condition
precedent for claim administrability and that one session with mediator would re-
present prima facie evidence of compliance with such requirement); Ulicny, supra
note 64, at 480 (observing that even when ADR is mandatory by contract, the ICC's
ADR Rules permit the parties to terminate ADR proceedings after an initial meeting
with the neutral).
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courts do not specify how long the mediation must last or how many
sessions the parties must attend. The mediation, therefore, will last
only as long as the parties wish to continue.
In some other countries, parties' participation in mediation may
not be mandated per se, 19 1 but use of certain other mechanisms can
strongly incentivize parties and influence their cost-benefit analyses
regarding the utility of mediation. In the U.K. and Hong Kong, for
example, courts may refuse to shift litigation-related costs if they
judge that a party was unreasonable in its refusal to mediate.
192
Some nations, such as the Netherlands, provide funding to support
parties' participation in mediation. 193 Other nations may condition,
or appear to condition, parties' access to legal aid funds upon their
participation in mediation. 194 Still other nations have created incen-
tives for the parties' lawyers to refer cases to mediation.' 95 Professor
191. See Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust, [2004] EWCA 3006 Civ 576
(opposing compulsory mediation but permitting the award of costs against a party
who refused to mediate). The Italian government adopted compulsory mediation,
pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 28 (2010). See Matthew Rushton, Mandatory Me-
diation Under Threat in Italy, JAMS ADR Blog (Oct. 30, 2012), http://jamsadr-
blog.com/2012/10/30/mandatory-mediation-under-threat-in-italy/. On October 24,
2012, however, Italy's Constitutional Court invalidated the compulsory mediation
program. Id.; Corte Cost., 24 ottobre 2012, n.272, Giur it. 2012 (It.). But see Rosalba
Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA, 2005 O.J. (C 134) 3 (holding that compulsory media-
tion does not violate Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights); see also
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1237, 1258
(2009) (describing evolving British jurisprudence on compulsory mediation and impo-
sition of costs).
192. See Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, supra note 191; see also Nolan-
Haley, supra note 182, at 999-1005 (describing the evolution of case law in England
regarding the imposition of costs for unreasonable refusal to participate in mediation,
as well as Italian law that may result in imposition of costs for refusal to accept "me-
diator's proposal"); Quek, supra note 187, at 503 (describing cost-shifting in Hong
Kong).
193. See Welsh, supra note 182, at 121 (observing that when the Netherlands es-
tablished its court-connected mediation program, "the government provided a media-
tion subsidy to those who elected the process pursuant to court invitation or the
advice of a legal advice helpdesk"). See also Nolan-Haley, supra note 182, at 1005-06
(observing that Bulgaria provides a partial refund of court filing fees to parties who
settle in mediation, while Romania provides a full refund of such fees). The ICC also
incentivizes the use of mediation by crediting half of the administrative ADR toward
the subsequent arbitration, if the mediation fails to produce a settlement. See Ulicny,
supra note 64, at 481.
194. See Welsh, supra note 182, at 122.
195. See Robert Dingwall, Divorce Mediation: Should We Change Our Mind? 32 J.
Soc. WELFARE & FAm. L. 107, 111 (2010) (urging that by treating mediation referrals
as a performance indicator, LSC has made an "implied threat that solicitors who
failed to achieve LSC targets would find their franchise brought into question"); see
also Pilot Insurance ADR Project Results in Many Settlements, 7 ALTS. TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 37, 40 (1989) (reporting results of pilot project involving several Connecticut
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Jack Coe has proposed the creation of a different and positive set of
incentives to use mediation in the investor-state context by having a
mediator in attendance throughout arbitration sessions and available
at any time (or at specific points) to facilitate the parties' discussion
of settlement. 19
6
3. Parties' Input Within Compulsory Systems
Even when courts have adopted a straightforward compulsory
mediation program, they may still give serious consideration to par-
ties' input in determining whether or not the mediation will take
place. As noted supra, some courts require only that the parties con-
sider the use of mediation and submit a document. An individual
judge or court administrator may then review the submission to de-
termine whether this particular case should be ordered into media-
tion. While the lawyers are likely to defer to a judge's expressed
support for mediation, 197 the judge or court administrator is also
likely to defer to the parties. If all of them agree that mediation is
not likely to be useful, an order to participate is doubtful. On the
other hand, the court is much less likely to defer to one party's reluc-
tance if another party expresses interest in mediation. Even after a
court has ordered the parties' participation in mediation, the court
also may permit the parties to opt out.198 Some courts grant such
insurers and finding that use of mediation increased as a result of making mediation
referrals one of the performance indicators for claims adjusters).
196. See Coe, Complementary Use, supra note 9, at 40; Coe, supra note 184, at 96-
100 (proposing "shadow mediator" and mediation as a parallel process with multiple
pre-set points of engagement); see also CEDR Commission on Settlement in Interna-
tional Arbitration, Final Report, 5, 7 (Nov. 2009) (providing for parallel mediation or
mediation "window" during pendency of arbitration); Ulicny, supra note 64, at 481
(observing that the ICC's ADR services are available to parties during the pendency of
their arbitration). This is interestingly similar to the settlement-facilitating role
played by magistrate judges in some federal district courts and staff mediators in
federal circuit courts, as well as the role played by community mediators in some
states' small claims courts. In these courts, the community mediators are in attend-
ance and available to parties who wish to attempt to reach a settlement through the
process before appearing before the judge or referee for a binding decision. See Patrick
G. Coy & Timothy Hedeen, A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-Optation: Commu-
nity Mediation in the United States, 46 Soc. Q. 405, 408 (2005) (detailing the history
of community mediation).
197. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 63, at 409.
198. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117, at 16-17.
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opt-outs on a very liberal basis. 19 9 Others require the party request-
ing the opt-out to make certain showings to demonstrate why the me-
diation would be duplicative of earlier efforts, unlikely to be
productive, or might even cause harm.
20 0
4. Mixed Compulsory and Voluntary Elements
In situations characterized by perceptions of power imbalance,
some agencies and corporations have provided that their own employ-
ees or associated entities must participate in mediation if a citizen,
consumer, or employee requests the process.2 0 1 Thus the mediation
process is voluntary for the party generally perceived as less power-
ful, but compulsory for the party perceived as more powerful and that
has established the program providing mediation. The U.S. Postal
Service (USPS), for example, offers a mediation program to resolve
workplace disputes. If an employee requests mediation to address a
dispute with her supervisor, the USPS requires the supervisor to par-
ticipate. 20 2 Similarly, some school districts in the U.S. provide that if
a parent requests mediation to resolve a special education dispute,
the school officials must participate. These approaches have had in-
teresting effects. The USPS, for example, has found that managers
have learned to listen more effectively to their employees, rather
than responding too quickly with answers or orders.20 3 School offi-
cials, meanwhile, value mediators' interventions that can help clarify
what parents are seeking for their children.20 4 In other words, they




201. See Welsh, Contender, supra note 81, at 1171, 1176-78 (noting that marginal-
ized plaintiffs have the power to force defendants to participate in litigation, parents
in some school districts have the power to force school officials to participate in special
education mediation, and USPS employees have the power to force their managers to
participate in the REDRESS mediation program); Andrea K. Schneider & Natalie
Fleury, There's No Place Like Home: Applying Dispute Systems Design Theory to Cre-
ate a Foreclosure Mediation System, 11 NEV. L.J. 368, 379 n. 44 (2011) (if homeowner
initiated foreclosure mediation, lender was required to participate); see also Ster-
nlight, supra note 118, at 85-90 (proposing that mandatory arbitration should be im-
posed on the company, not the "little guy").
202. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, supra note 79, at 113; USPS REDRESS, supra
note 174 ("If REDRESS is offered and the employee requests mediation, the appropri-
ate management official will participate in the process in good faith").
203. See Jonathan F. Anderson & Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Upstream Effects from
Mediation of Workplace Disputes: Some Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LA.
L.J. 601, 607-08 (1997).
204. See Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 81, at 581.
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In the investor-state context, if an investor has worked with a
lead agency or pursued administrative review20 5 in compliance with
a BIT's pre-arbitration requirements, and the investor then requests
mediation with an independent third party mediator (or requests a
case conference or initial mediation session as described supra), the
BIT could compel the state or affected agency to comply with such
request. One concern with this approach might be that multinational
corporations, which are likely to face the same types of investment
concerns around the globe, will be advantaged by having more knowl-
edge and experience with the mediation process, the available pool of
mediators, and relevant substantive issues.20 6 This concern is less
compelling, of course, if the investor is neither a multinational corpo-
ration nor a sophisticated repeat player in international trade. Fur-
ther, in mediation, representatives of the state will not be obligated
to reach an agreement unless and until they are satisfied regarding
the appropriateness, value, and consequences of such agreement. In
making such determinations, they would be able to consider the in-
vestor's reputation in its dealings with other similarly-situated
states.
5. The Effects of Compulsory Mediation
Some commentators have urged that neither legislatures nor
courts should make mediation compulsory because this represents a
violation of the parties' self-determination 20 7 and may have the effect
of coercing settlements and reducing actual or perceived access to the
205. See INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 68-73 (providing a description
of Peru, etc.).
206. See Edward Brunet, Reevaluating Complex Mediation Generalizations, 18
CONN. INS. L.J. 279, 281 (2011-2012) (observing that "defendant insurers are often
data-rich 'repeat players' who know the score due often to access to much more infor-
mation than their opponents regarding relevant judgments and settlements"); Riskin
& Welsh, supra note 113, at 864-66 (describing the influence of civil litigation "repeat
players" upon the mediation process); see also Rogers, supra note 14, at 357-58 (re-
garding repeat players' general advantages in arbitration and developing countries'
lack of experience and sophistication in selecting arbitrators); Catherine A. Rogers,
Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Stan-
dards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 112 n. 340 (2005).
207. See Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 122, at 18, n. 68 (citing various com-
mentators); John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases in State Courts: A
Litigants Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 813,
830-31 (1999). Based on the experience of the U.S., Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley
has recently urged an end to compulsory mediation. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,
Judicial Review of Mediated Settlement Agreements: Improving Mediation with Con-
sent, 5 PENN ST. Y.B ON ARB. & MEDIATION - (forthcoming 2013) (proposing an end to
compulsory, court-connected mediation and the requirement of informed consent to
mediate).
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courts. 20 8 As should be obvious from the discussion supra, this con-
cern applies primarily to the most intrusive compulsory referral
schemes that require participation in the entire mediation process.
Even for these types of schemes, however, some commentators have
expressed support for time-limited compulsory programs in order to
encourage lawyers and other repeat players to learn how to partici-
pate in the process. 20 9 Research has then demonstrated that lawyers
who have experienced mediation are likely to recommend its use on a
voluntary basis.210 After this provisional period of compulsion,
courts have then been able to convert to voluntary programs or pro-
vide for easy opt-outs.
211
The effects of compulsory referral have been generally, and per-
haps surprisingly, salutary. Although settlement rates tend to be
somewhat lower for compulsory mediation 212 than voluntary media-
tion, 213 they remain very high. The simple requirement to partici-
pate in the process, and participate knowledgeably, generates
settlements.2 14 Because compulsory mediation increases the number
of cases that go to mediation, the absolute number of settlements
208. See Welsh, Place of Mediation, supra note 112, at 142.
209. Sander, et al., supra note 187, at 886; Welsh, Place of Mediation, supra note
112, at 142; McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 63, at 426.
210. See Roselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to Water: The Impact of
an ADR "Confer and Report" Rule, 26 JUST. Sys. J. 253, 263 (2005) (reporting empiri-
cal research showing that after the adoption of a court rule requiring lawyers to con-
fer regarding ADR and report certain information to the court, lawyers also became
more likely to discuss the possible use of a voluntary ADR process with their clients
and voluntary use of ADR occurred more frequently).
211. See Welsh, Place of Mediation, supra note 112, at 139-41; McAdoo & Welsh,
supra note 63, at 413.
212. See Wissler Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 90, at 676, n. 137 (report-
ing that some research revealed no difference between voluntary and mandatory re-
ferrals, while other research showed a higher rate of settlement for voluntary use of
mediation).
213. See Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent
Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers, 12 NEGOT. J. 259, 260-67
(1996) (asserting 81% settlement rate in study of 449 contract- and tort-based dis-
putes); see also EILEEN CARROLL & KARL MACKIE, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION - THE
ART OF BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 91 (2000) (reporting Center for Dispute Resolution's set-
tlement rates); Robert Coulson, Arbitration and Other Forms of Alternative Dispute
Resolution - General Overview, in WORLDWIDE FORUM ON THE ARBITRATION OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 21, 22 (1994) (reporting AAA commercial mediation set-
tlement rates of more than 80%); James A. Wall & Timothy C. Dunne, Mediation
Research: A Current Review, 28 NEGOT. J. 217, 229-30 (2012) (summarizing studies
that show 60-90% settlement rate).
214. Research has long supported the settlement value of scheduling litigation
"events." See Stephen J. Spurr, The Duration of Litigation, 19 LAW & POL'Y 285, 305
(1997), cited in Lisa Blomgren Bingham, et al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing
Trial: Comparing Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J.
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achieved through mediation is higher. Depending upon the timing of
the order to mediate, mediation can also produce settlements that are
earlier and cost less.215 Also, in general, parties express satisfaction
with these court-mandated procedures and perceive the process as
procedurally fair. 216 Parties have the opportunity to craft creative,
customized solutions-and sometimes they do. Of course, there are
also some instances when parties are dissatisfied with their mediator
or the process 217 as well as occasions when parties have refused to
cooperate with courts' attendance and submission requirements de-
signed to enhance mediation's effectiveness. 218 There is also worri-
some evidence of some repeat players using the mediation process
inappropriately.21 9 Nonetheless, both the empirically-demonstrated
successes and challenges experienced by domestic courts' mediation
programs shed light on how to structure a mediation referral system
that would fit the investor-state context, particularly if the mediation
process is managed by an organization that is similar to the best
ON Disp. RESOL. 225, 256 n. 129 (2009); see also Barkett, supra note 144, at 364 (sug-
gesting the mediation is more successful if it is preceded by some shared knowledge
regarding the evidence supporting claims and defenses).
215. See DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF
THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT OF 1990 19 (1997); Wissler & Dauber, supra note 210, at 270; JULIE MACFARLANE,
LAW COMM'N OF CANADA, CULTURE CHANGE? COMMERCIAL LITIGATORS AND THE ONTA-
RIO MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM 14 (2008); see also McAdoo & Welsh, supra note
63, at 422-25 (citing Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation supra note 90, at 694 (cites
to several studies where the design of the program ensured an early mediation and,
as a result, reduced discovery)); John Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Man-
agement in Courts and Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 81,
85-86 (2008). But see Barkett, supra note 144, at 389-90 (discouraging use of media-
tion before arbitration commences; noting that court-connected mediation is likely to
occur after the exchange of initial pleadings and some initial discovery).
216. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 63, at 422-425; Wissler, Court-Connected
Mediation supra note 90, at 661-663; Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding
Out If It Is True: Comparing Mediation and Negotiation Through Research, 2002 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 131, 140-142 (2002).
217. See Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 122, at 15.
218. See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-
Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 86
(2002); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Rec-
onciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confi-
dentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 596 (2001).
219. See Nancy A. Welsh, Musings, supra note 128, at 19.
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courts, i.e., sufficiently independent and neutral of the key stakehold-
ers, assertive regarding the value of participating in mediation
220
and responsive to the dangers of repeat player dynamics.
221
From a dispute system design perspective, any compulsory refer-
ral scheme should maintain parties' ability to loop forward and back-
ward among different processes. This suggests that even if the
default model of mediation in the investor-state context is facilitative
and interest-based mediation, supplemented by consideration of
220. Although this Article is not focusing on the important role that dispute reso-
lution facilities can play in encouraging parties' use of mediation, it is worthwhile to
note here that some courts have been very effective in helping parties to customize
the process to meet their needs. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 920-21 (dis-
cussing the approach used by mediation staff members at the U.S. District Court of
the Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit); Welsh, supra note 182, at
132 (discussing the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California and the
Ninth Circuit); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117, at 15 (describing one federal district
court-specifically, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michi-
gan-that has been very successful in persuading parties to use the court's voluntary
mediation program).
221. See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE
L. REV. 1174, 1194 (2010); Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes
Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors' Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitra-
tion, 2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 349, 389 (reporting research initiated by SICA that found
investors were much less likely than industry representatives to perceive procedural
fairness in securities arbitration context); see also FINANCLL INDUSTRY REGULATORY
AUTHORITY (FINRA), SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION INVESTOR ADVISORY
COMMITTEE PANEL ON SECURITIES ARBITRATION - MAY 17, 2010, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
REGULATORY AUTHORITY STATEMENT ON KEY ISSUES 4 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/spot-
lightlinvadvcomm/iacmeeting05l7l0-finra.pdf (reporting change in FINRA rules al-
lowing investors to elect an all public arbitral panel, though they continue to have the
option of selecting a panel consisting of two public arbitrators and one industry arbi-
trator); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rat-
ing System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective
Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985, 1005-07
(2012) (describing various efforts that have been undertaken by the American Arbi-
tration Association, Council of Better Business Bureaus, Securities and Exchange
Commission, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Federal Trade Commission and
other public and private entities to develop and implement protocols focused on the
provision of fair procedures); Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 112, at 423-24
(complimenting FINRA and SICA for being "remarkably proactive"); Nancy A. Welsh,
Mandatory Predispute Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural
Safeguards, 42 Sw. U. L. REV. 187 (2012) (describing Supreme Court's recognition of
structural bias in ERISA context and proposing application of resulting test to
mandatory predispute arbitration in consumer, employment and other disparate
party arbitration). There is also a fairly substantial body of literature regarding the
effectiveness of corporations' internal dispute systems, including the use of mediation.
See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to
the Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 2-3 (1998). The procedural and substantive fairness of such
internal systems is likely to depend, at least in part, on continued access to the courts.
See Welsh, Contender, supra note 81, at 1175.
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rights and evaluative mediator interventions as needed, the parties
still should be able to elect a different consensual procedure. Parties'
ability to select their preferred consensual option might also be
achieved by limiting the compulsory mediation requirement to one of
the less-intrusive options described supra.
6. Recommended Compulsory Elements in the Investor-State
Context
Based on dispute system design and procedural justice consider-
ations, this Article recommends mandating parties' participation in
an initial meeting to learn about mediation and other consensual op-
tions. Even such a compulsory scheme, though, could benefit from
the engagement of stakeholders and the demonstrated support of
strong global actors, such as the World Bank, ICSID, and UNCTAD.
The currently low incidence of voluntary usage of conciliation and
mediation in the investment treaty context could suggest that the
processes are not needed, or as constructed, do not respond to parties'
perceived needs. In the investor-state context, however, some of the
strongest proponents of mediation are states and investors-and
some of the strongest opponents have not seemed to be aware of the
many variations available for mediation and compulsory referral. In-
stead, they have assumed that the only approach to compulsory medi-
ation is the most intrusive one. 222 As we have outlined, this
assumption is too narrow.
Both dispute system design principles and procedural justice re-
search suggest the value of engaging stakeholders directly in discus-
sion and decision-making regarding the mediation models and
referral schemes that would be most responsive in the investment
treaty context. Such engagement, along with strong encouragement
from important global actors such as the World Bank, is likely to pro-
duce the incentives that will encourage mediation's use. For exam-
ple, if stakeholders can count on the support of the World Bank, they
may embrace a period of "coerced education" as described supra to
ensure that mediation will receive sufficient use to justify the simul-
taneous provision of relevant education, training, and support.
222. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 42, at 28-29 (not supportive of compulsory medi-
ation); Reed, supra note 42, at 30 (not supportive of compulsory mediation).
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C. Mediation Quality Assurance /Accountability Mechanisms223
According to dispute system design principles, once a dispute
resolution system's objectives and operation have been established
and stakeholders have begun electing the procedures to be used to
resolve their disputes, mechanisms must be established to ensure the
system's and procedures' accountability to the stakeholders. Courts
and agencies in the U.S. have adopted mediation primarily in order
to settle cases224 and provide parties with the opportunity to be more
engaged in the resolution of their disputes.2 25 As a result, they have
used three approaches to regulate the quality of mediation and hold
the process accountable. Interestingly enough, the first approach fo-
cuses on regulating the parties' behavior and making them accounta-
ble to the court or agency-and each other. The second approach
focuses on making the mediator accountable to the court or agency
and the parties. The third approach-making courts accountable to
the Congress and state legislatures (or the citizenry more generally)
for the quality of their mediation programs-has been accomplished
on a much more ad hoc basis. In this Article, we will do no more than
introduce these different approaches. Much more could be said, and
has been said,226 about them.
227
223. See Charles H. Brower, Confronting the Truth: Sources and Magnitude of
Decentralization in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 339-48 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (explaining
current and future extreme variability of arbitral outcomes in investment
arbitration).
224. See Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 122, at 59-60; McAdoo & Welsh,
supra note 63, at 406.
225. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 63, at 406; McAdoo, supra note 188, at 399;
Brazil, supra note 108, at 240 (2007) (exploring what it means for litigants to feel
"well-served by their public institutions[,]" particularly the courts, in court-connected
mediation).
226. See, e.g., Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy
and Practice in Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DIsEp. RESOL. 303, at (2004);
Charles Pou, Jr., Mediator Quality Assurance: A Report to the Maryland Mediator
Quality Assurance Oversight Committee, Md. State Bar Ass'n 1 2002 (catdgorizing
approaches based on "the height of the 'hurdles' that mediators must meet at the
outset to engage in practice" and "the amount of 'maintenance' or development aid
required to broaden their awareness and enhance skills over time"); Ellen Waldman,
Credentialing Approaches: The Slow Movement Toward Skills-Based Testing Contin-
ues, 8 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 13 (2001); Craig A. McEwen, Giving Meaning to Mediator
Professionalism, 11 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 3 (2005); Nancy A. Welsh, Institutionalization
and Professionalization, in HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 65, 494-
98.
227. This Article will not discuss parties' apparent dissatisfaction with, and disa-
greement regarding, some of the terms contained in investment treaties. See Schnei-
der, supra note 24 (discussing the varying interpretations used by the arbitral
tribunals of the BIT emergency clauses under international law). Needless to say,
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1. Accountability of the Parties to the Court and Each Other
As noted supra, procedural justice research indicates that the na-
ture of parties' interaction with each other in mediation matters, and
parties are more likely to perceive the mediation process as fair if
their lawyers perceive each other as behaving cooperatively. 228 This
research suggests the importance of thoughtful management of the
parties' interactions, as well as the importance of lawyers' prepara-
tion of themselves and their clients for respectful, thoughtful partici-
pation.229 Other research also indicates that when disputants
negotiate with each other in a manner that is perceived as procedur-
ally just, they are more likely to maximize joint outcomes. 230 It is not
clear that there is a causal relationship here, but the correlation 231 is
quite striking, and provides an additional incentive for respectful,
thoughtful participation.
Of course, courts cannot require settlement, mutual listening, or
other procedurally just behavior. What courts in the U.S. have done,
however, is require the lawyers and parties to make submissions that
demonstrate lawyers' preparation and consultation with their cli-
ents,232 require the participation of lawyers and parties with author-
ity in the mediation, and impose an obligation to mediate "in good
faith."233 Thus far, courts have tended to focus on compliance with
however, investors' and states' disagreements over the meaning of key terms, the in-
tent of the drafters, and the applicability of the terms to non-signatories resemble
parties' disagreements over the meaning and intent of state and federal statutes-
and suggest the important role that adjudication plays in making Congress and state
legislatures accountable to the citizenry. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE.
L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
228. See Wissler & Dauber, supra note 210, at 266-68.
229. See Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 90, at 686-87 (reporting
that clients who were more prepared by their lawyers perceived the mediation process
as fairer; similarly, lawyers who were more prepared reported greater perceptions of
procedural fairness).
230. See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 89, at 489-90; see also Welsh,
Reputational Advantages, supra note 63, at 127-130 (exploring relationships among
perceptions of effectiveness in negotiation, elements of a cooperative style of negotia-
tion, interactional elements that lead to perceptions of procedural justice, and behav-
iors that lead to perceptions of trustworthiness).
231. It is also consistent with Morton Deutsch's "crude law of social relations" that
"the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship
also tend to elicit that type of social relationship." Morton Deutsch, Conflict Resolu-
tion: Theory and Practice, 4 POL. PSYCHOL. 431, 438 (1983).
232. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 898 (urging courts to require lawyers
to consult with their clients regarding their objectives for the mediation session, in
order to permit appropriate customization).
233. See Weston supra note 218, at 596; see also Lande, supra note 218, at 78;
Tania Sourdin, Good Faith, Bad Faith? Making an Effort in Dispute Resolution
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the specific, objective requirements referenced supra-e.g., attend-
ance by those with settlement authority and submission of required
pre-mediation documents-to shape the legal boundaries of "good
faith" participation. 234 Courts regularly establish such require-
ments, and better practice (as well as dispute system design) sug-
gests the value of soliciting stakeholders' input on the elements of
such an obligation.
23 5
2. Accountability of the Mediators to the Court and Parties
As outlined above, the second method to ensure a quality process
is to focus on the quality and skills of the mediator. Courts have
adopted a wide variety of approaches to make mediators accountable
to the courts for the quality of their mediation services. 23 6 Many
courts try to regulate quality by establishing entry requirements.
For example, numerous courts require their mediators to receive a
specified number of hours of training in mediation skills; few courts,
however, regulate the training programs, and research has been
mixed regarding the value of mediation training.237 Some courts re-
quire their mediators to observe other "master" mediators' media-
tions or co-mediate with an experienced mediator before they will be
(2012), available at http://www.civiljustice.info/goodf/l (reviewing case law regarding
requirement of good faith in negotiation and mediation, in Australia).
234. See also Barkett, supra note 144, at 385 (describing UNCITRAL's obligation
to cooperate in good faith with conciliator); Franck, supra note 22, at 197 n. 156 (dis-
cussing whether obligation to negotiate and consult before initiating arbitration re-
quires "good faith" negotiation).
235. See Lande, supra note 114, at 127 (proposing the use of dispute system design
principles for determining good faith requirements).
236. See Welsh, supra note 226, at 487; McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117, at 22-23
(on training and qualifications).
237. See McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 155, at
434 Table 13 (2002) (reporting the following responses from surveyed lawyers to the
question "What mediator qualifications are important to you?": mediator should have
substantive experience in field of law related to case (84.2%); mediator should be a
litigator (66.2%); mediator should be a lawyer (63.6%); mediator should have taken
mediation training (42.8%); mediator has a reputation for settling cases (39.4%));
McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 155, at 524 Table 33 (reporting the following re-
sponses from surveyed lawyers to the question "What mediator qualifications are im-
portant to you?": mediator knows how to value a case (87%); mediator should be a
litigator (83%); mediator should be a lawyer (77%); mediator knows how to help par-
ties clarify issues (74%); mediator should have substantive experience in the field of
law (69%); mediator should have taken mediation training (49%); mediator has sub-
stantial mediation experience (46%); mediator knows how to find creative solutions
(35%); mediator is good at helping lawyers and clients identify their non-legal inter-
ests (31%); mediator has reputation for settling cases (28%); mediator has experience
as a judge (25%); mediator is good at "knocking heads" (16%)). But see Susan Raines,
et al., Best Practices for Mediation Training and Regulation: Preliminary Findings, 48
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certified or admitted to a roster. 238 A substantial number of courts
require their mediators to be lawyers, often with a specified number
of years of experience. Interestingly, research fails to confirm that
subject matter expertise results in a greater number of settle-
ments.239 On the other hand, research indicates that settlement is
more likely if mediators are trusted and viewed as "high quality,"
240
and, as noted supra, when lawyers are permitted to play a role in
selecting mediators, they generally seem to prefer other lawyers with
relevant subject matter expertise. Some of the most experienced
court programs use a mix of these various requirements, tailored to
particular practice areas. 241 Meanwhile, some ADR organizations
have found ways to facilitate potential clients' ability to assess
mediators' reputations and approaches. The International Mediation
Institute, for example, posts information gathered from former cli-
ents regarding their experience with mediators.
242
Many courts have also established ethical rules for the mediators
who handle court referrals. These rules represent a means to hold
the mediators accountable to the court. Less obvious but just as im-
portant, such rules and their transparent enforcement help to make
FAm. CT. REV. 541, 544-45 (2010) (observing that authors used a collaborative assess-
ment process that involved a broad range of stakeholders, including Florida judges,
court program administrators, mediation trainers, mediators and DRC staff, in order
to make recommendations for "best practices" in mediation training).
238. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 10.100 (West 2012) (describing a multitude of require-
ments that must be fulfilled in order to gain court approval to serve as a mediator).
239. See Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 90, at 699.
240. See, e.g., Douglas Henderson, Mediation Success: An Empirical Analysis, 11
OHIO ST. J. ON Dirp. RESOL. 105, 132-45 (1996) (focus on construction mediation; "high
quality" not defined); see also Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, Further In-
vestigation into the Secrets of Successful and Unsuccessful Mediators, 26 ALT. TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 149 (2008) ("The sole characteristic shared by nearly all the 13 mediators
in the top half on the overall scores was that 11 of the 13 were a standard deviation
above the mean on at least one of the confidence-building attributes").
241. See Welsh, supra note 226, at 496-97 (describing Florida's system for certify-
ing mediators); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117, at 19-21.
242. See Irena Vanenkova, What's in it for me? Certification and the Laws of Sup-
ply and Demand, 5 N.Y. Disp. Resol. Lawyer 51, 52 (describing certification as con-
ducted by the International Mediation Institute, including third party's solicitation
and distillation of feedback from clients for posting online); see, e.g., Feedback Exam-
ple, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, http://imimediation.org/feedback-example
(last visited Oct. 28, 2012); see also Michael McIlwrath & Rolan Schroeder, Trans-
parency in International Arbitration: What Are Arbitrators and Institutions Afraid
Of?, in CONTEMPoRARY IssuEs 2010, supra note 17, at 343-44, 347-49, 351 (proposing
information that should be made available by arbitral institutions and arbitrators to
assist with parties' selection of arbitrators, decrying the reliability of word-of-mouth
recommendations or ad hoc, individual feedback to arbitrators, and referencing a
standardized arbitrator evaluation form developed in 2006 at the behest of Thomas
Wolde).
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the courts accountable to the parties who participate in court-con-
nected mediation processes and to the public more generally. Courts'
ethical rules are based largely on the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators adopted by the ABA, AAA, and SPIDR (later ACR) in 1994
and 2005.243 But relatively few courts have established formal griev-
ance or performance evaluation procedures. 244 Even fewer courts
have established mechanisms for the provision of advisory opinions
to guide their mediators. 245 These formal and advisory mechanisms,
where they exist and are transparent, help to ensure that mediators
are truly accountable to the courts and that courts themselves are
accountable to the parties and public.
246
3. Accountability of the Courts to the Parties and the Public
The final method that courts use to assure the quality of their
mediation programs (and to demonstrate both their own and their
mediators' accountability) involves post-mediation evaluation. 247 Af-
ter mediation sessions have occurred, some courts solicit and collect
243. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994); see also MODEL STAN.
DARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005); R. Wayne Thorpe & Susan M. Yates, An
Overview of the Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 12 Disp. RESOL.
MAG. 30, (2005-2006); Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again: Why the Devil Is
Not in the Details, 12 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 31, (2005-2006); Joseph B. Stulberg, The
Model Standards of Conduct: A Reply to Professor Moffitt, 12 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 34,
(2005-2006).
244. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117, at 24-25 (regarding support and evalu-
ation); Riskin & Welsh supra note 113, at 927. The ABA Dispute Resolution Section
recently adopted a policy supporting credentialing of mediators provided that creden-
tialing programs: clearly define the skills, knowledge and values which persons it cre-
dentials must possess; ensure that candidates have training adequate to instill those
skills, knowledge and values; be administered by an organization distinct from the
organization which trains the candidate; have an assessment process capable of deter-
mining with consistency whether or not candidates possess the defined skills, knowl-
edge and values; explain clearly to persons likely to rely on the credential what is
being certified; and provide an accessible, transparent system to register complaints
against credentialed mediators, promptly and fairly investigate complaints and, if ap-
propriate, de-credential a mediator who fails to comply with standards. A majority of
the Task Force that recommended this policy also believed that organizations should
have a process to monitor the performance of credentialed mediators, such as periodic
requests for feedback. See ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON MEDIATOR CREDENTIALING: FINAL REPORT (Au-
gust 2012).
245. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 117, at 12-13.
246. See Sharon Press, Institutionalization of Mediation in Florida: At the Cross-
roads, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 43, 53-55 (2003); Sharon Press, Florida Provides a Sys-
tem of Grievances Against Mediators, 7 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 8, (2001).
247. See Roselle L. Wissler & Robert W. Rack, Jr., Assessing Mediator Perform-
ance: The Usefulness of Participant Questionnaires, 2004 J. Disp. RESOL. 229 (2004)
(assessing the usefulness of participant assessments of mediator performance);
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evaluations from the parties and their attorneys. Very frequently,
these surveys include questions designed to elicit perceptions regard-
ing mediation's effectiveness, efficiency, procedural justice, and dis-
tributive justice. Parties are much less likely than their lawyers to
complete these surveys unless they are administered and collected
immediately after the mediation session. This difference in the likeli-
hood of receiving parties' feedback is significant because research re-
sults suggest divergence between lawyers' perceptions and those of
their clients. 248 Courts' use of these surveys also varies. Courts fre-
quently do not have the resources required to conduct a thorough re-
view of the data they have collected and to consider what the data
may mean. A smaller number of courts keep quantitative data re-
garding the number of cases referred to mediation, the types of cases,
key events, the date of disposition, and mediation outcomes. Unfor-
tunately, federal and state courts, even courts located in the same
state, record different pieces of data, making comparisons difficult.249
In some infrequent cases, courts do invest the resources required for
rigorous quantitative evaluation 250 or for staff members to conduct
Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil Jus-
tice, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 227, 251-253 (2007) (describing the post-media-
tion questionnaires distributed by the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of
California).
248. See TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DE-
FENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 33-4 (2009); Tamara Relis, It's Not
About the Money!: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' Litigation, 68 U. PITT. L.
REV. 701, 728-33 (2007); Schneider & Fleury, supra note 201, at 389-90; Riskin &
Welsh, supra note 113, at 910 (noting divergence of perceptions and preferences be-
tween lawyers and many, especially one-shot player, clients); Welsh, Making Deals,
supra note 83, at 842-44; Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 112, at 4-5.
249. See Memorandum from ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Task Force on Re-
search and Statistics to Court Administrators and ADR Program Administrators, Top
Ten Pieces of Information Courts Should Collect on ADR 1 (2005) (recognizing con-
straints on courts' information management systems but requesting collection of
ADR-related information); see also Court ADR Instruction Manual, RSI, http://
courtadr.org/manual/monitor.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
250. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK, ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVAL-
UATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996);
JAMES S. KAKALIK, ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALU-
ATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996); STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note
215, at i-iii; Wayne Kobbervig, Mediation of Civil Cases in Hennepin County: An
Evaluation 23-26 (Minn. Judicial Center 1991); Anderson & Pi, supra note 184, at 566
(California data). There is some controversy about whether a quantitative study can
be considered sufficiently valid if it does not involve random assignment and control
groups. Needless to say, courts are likely to find it very difficult to prioritize research
purity as more important than providing people with access to a process they believe
to be beneficial. Researchers, as well, must struggle with this issue of access. See The
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observations of mediators. 2 51 Certain agencies, particularly the U.S.
Postal Service, have affirmatively selected particular models of medi-
ation and have then implemented monitoring and evaluation systems
to ensure their use.
252
Obviously, engaging in hands-on efforts to ensure the quality of
mediators and mediations requires funding and staffing. Many
courts have adopted mediation programs for the exact purpose of sav-
ing time and costs. Investing in the staffing and evaluation that is
required for meaningful quality control thus may seem counter-intui-
tive. In some states, though, such evaluation is done on a regular
basis for the other key neutrals located in courts, e.g., judges, magis-
trate judges, etc., in order to provide these neutrals with feedback.
253
Though such evaluations are not generally shared with the public,
some courts have recently shared data as they have assessed the pub-
lic's general perceptions of the courts.
25 4
4. Recommendation for the Investor-State Context
Although it is worthwhile to consider the experience of U.S.
courts and agencies in assuring quality and accountability, it is also
important to recognize that the investment treaty context involves
many fewer cases and may be even more likely to be dominated by a
small group of repeat-player lawyers who represent both investors
and nations. Given this difference, the best means of assuring the
quality of mediation, at least initially, is likely to lie in selecting
mediators who are already trusted by the repeat players.2 55 For
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects of Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1979) (listing the "basic ethical
principles" as respect for persons, beneficence and justice and observing that "[an
injustice occurs when some benefit to which a person is entitled is denied without
good reason or when some burden is imposed unduly"), available at http://
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html.
251. See Brad Honoroffet al., Putting Mediation Skills to the Test, 6 NEGOT. J. 37,
228-38 (1990) (describing experiment in Massachusetts; note, however, that there is
no longer widespread court-connected non-family civil mediation in Massachusetts);
see also Grace D'Alo, Accountability in Special Education Mediation: Many a Slip
'Twixt Vision and Practice?, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 229-37 (2003) (describing
observations of special education mediators).
252. See Nabatchi & Blomgren Bingham, supra note 142, at 405-409 (2001).
253. See CourTools, supra note 110, at 2 (regarding procedural justice-related
feedback provided to courts and individual judges).
254. See ROrrMAN, supra note 86, at 1.
255. This cannot be the only safeguard, of course. See e.g., Rogers, supra note 54,
Gottwald, supra note 54; James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judi-
cial Abdication to Class Action Mediators, 5 PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB & MEDIATION -
(forthcoming 2013) (expressing concerns regarding reliance on small pool of mediators
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many years, for example, a small group of trusted men served as in-
ternational commercial arbitrators. 256 The prestige earned by the ar-
bitration process was due, at least in part, to these men's
involvement in it.257 Current investment treaty disputants could
rely upon the breadth of experience and good judgment-social, legal,
and political-of this group of men and women,258 on a temporary
basis. Mechanisms to bring these mediators together on a regular
basis would have the potential to encourage their creation of a shared
vision, body of substantive knowledge, skills, and sense of identity
and ethics.259 Collectively, they may also develop the model (or mod-
els 260 ) of mediation that could serve as the future defaults in this
context.
If this approach to mediator selection is taken, however, "succes-
sion planning" would also have to be done, quickly, with resources
identified to permit observation of these mediators and mentoring of
potential mediators whose professional backgrounds, nationalities,
ethnicities and gender will signal to all stakeholders-not just the
to provide evidence that class action settlements are the result of arms-length negoti-
ation and not the result of collusion).
256. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepre-
neurs: Constructing International Justice from the Competition for Transnational
Business Disputes, 29 LAw & Soc'y REV. 27, 30-33 (1995). Interestingly, it appears
that parties continue to use a relatively small number of individuals for international
arbitration. See, e.g., McIlwrath & Schroeder, supra note 242, at 355-56 (noting that
the current system of international arbitration leads to repeated use of same arbitra-
tors and perception of "arbitration 'mafia'"); Elsing, supra note 59, at 308 (raising
concerns regarding lack of access to international arbitrators).
257. Such men likely gained their persuasive power from both their pre-existing
status and their performance in individual cases. See Donna Shestowsky, Psychology
and Persuasion, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 83, at 361-70.
258. Note, however, that some commentators have expressed uncertainty regard-
ing the ability to identify those who should serve as investment treaty mediators,
observing that the appropriate expertise "requires understanding of public policy
dimensions which are grafted onto purely commercial interests." Cheng, supra note
17, at 440. Others have worried particularly that moving international commercial
arbitrators into investor-state arbitration has resulted in a structural bias favoring
investors over states. David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International In-
vestment Arbitration: Seeking An Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 383 (2010). This concern would need to be addressed in mediator
selection as well.
259. See Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, supra note 226, at
494-5 (describing the elements of professionalism); Craig McEwen, Giving Meaning to
Mediator Professionalism, 11 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 5 (2005) (regarding value of "active
communities of practice").
260. Recalling, of course, there will and must be process pluralism-which some
colleagues seem to recall almost effortlessly. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 77, at 555; John Lande, supra note 77, at 147.
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repeat players-that they will receive a procedurally just process. 26 1
In other words, the reputations and identities of the mediators will
need to assure stakeholders that they can trust the process and will
be allowed to express themselves, will receive sincere and trustwor-
thy consideration, and will be treated in an even-handed and respect-
ful manner in a neutral forum. 262 These signals will matter. At the
same time, of course, results should be transparent in order to permit
stakeholders to assess whether there is an emerging and consistent
pattern of bias.263 As described supra, and despite the stature of
these mediators, the investment mediation process should include
both a grievance procedure and periodic evaluation of these
mediators.264 Indeed, mediators of this stature are likely to be ready
to model compliance with such procedures.
Finally, the institutions managing mediation in the investor-
state context should mimic the transparency modeled by those court,
261. On this point, Professor Mariana Hernandez Crespo has recently proposed
the use of co-mediation.
262. Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 112, at 424-25; see Jill I. Gross, SEC
Seeks Public Comment on Two FINRA Dispute Resolution Rule Proposals, ADR PROF.
BLOG (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=3445; Jill I. Gross, SEC Ap-
proves FINRA Proposal to Exempt Collective Actions from FINRA Arbitration, ADR
PROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2012) http://www.indisputably.org/?p=3558; Jill I. Gross, SEC
Approves Rule Change to Raise the Cap for FINRA Simplified Arbitration Claims to
$50,000, ADR PROF BLOG (May 5, 2012) http://www.indisputably.org/?p=3592.
263. We realize, of course, that such a call for transparency may conflict with par-
ties' desire for confidential mediated settlement agreements. Some magistrate judges
in the federal district courts in the U.S. have also dealt with this issue by creating
"settlement logs" that permit the magistrates to speak with some knowledge regard-
ing the range of settlements for particular types of disputes, without revealing confi-
dential identifying information. See Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial
Settlement Databases: Development and Uses, 43 JUDGES J. 19, 19 (2004). Perhaps
this innovation could be used (or adapted) by ICSID, UNCTAD and other providers of
dispute resolution in the investment treaty context. For the development of greater
transparency in the NAFTA context, see Coe, Transparency, supra note 7, at 1339-40.
Interestingly, even though court-connected research reveals that the public's approval
of courts is likely to be improved by reporting regarding courts' performance, such
reports appear unlikely to affect their perceptions of the procedural fairness provided
by the courts. See RorrMAN, supra note 86, at 35.
264. Writing about how the two ways in which organizations gain deference, Tom
Tyler has observed:
An organization can gain deference by having formal rules that reflect neu-
trality. It can also gain deference through the personal relationships that
exist between employees and their own particular supervisors. The former
approach reflects a neutrality model of procedural fairness, the latter ap-
proach a trust-based model. Similarly, the police can gain deference because
they are viewed as following professional rules of conduct and uniform proce-
dures, or particular police officers can be respected and known in their com-
munities and can, through these personalized connections, gain deference.
Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 83, at 122.
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agency and non-profit organizations that conduct regular process
evaluations, collate and disseminate the aggregate results, and make
responsive changes. 265 These management choices, too, should en-




The viability of investor-state arbitration is dependent upon
states' and investors' faith that the process will help them achieve
their complementary goals of increased private investment, the
avoidance of unfair expropriation, and the provision of a forum for
the prompt and fair resolution of disputes. Some states' refusal to
comply with arbitration awards, as well as some investors' pursuit of
creative claims, threatens to undermine this necessary element of
faith and, with it, the regime of investor-state investment treaties.
Meanwhile, the expense and contentiousness of the arbitration pro-
cess itself has become an impediment to its use.
If arbitration is to play its valuable role in facilitating interna-
tional investment, it requires the addition of other processes and the
development of a coherent dispute resolution system. Dispute system
design principles clearly counsel the value of various process choices;
the most robust systems offer more than one process to meet the
needs of stakeholders and intentionally incorporate processes that fo-
cus presumptively on interests as distinct from rights. Procedural
justice theories and research should also guide the development or
amendment of dispute resolution systems, with reminders to provide
stakeholders the opportunity to speak, reassurance that their views
265. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 112 at 421, 423-24 (describing
researcher's use of data that is regularly collected in California regarding arbitration,
as well as FINRA's use of evaluation data to make procedural changes); Sandra K.
Partridge, Arbitration Post-AT& T Mobility v. Concepcion at the American Arbitration
Association-A Service Provider's Perspective, 4 PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION
81, 83-84, 86 (2013) (describing searchable online docket to track cases through each
stage of the AAA Class Arbitration process, as well as data that AAA makes available
regarding the consumer cases that it administers); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical
Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405 (2007) (describing the data on arbitration that is publicly
available in California); see also CPR-GEORGETOWN COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND STAN-
DARDS OF PRACTICE IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 17 (2002);
Nancy H. Rogers, et al., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DisPuTEs
319-356 (2013) (providing an overview of the systematic collection of data, and the use
of such data, for those designing and revising dispute systems).
266. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 113, at 912 (urging private ADR providers to
adopt court-focused proposals "for competitive or altruistic reasons, or both"); see also
Barendrecht, supra note 175, at 14-20.
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will be considered, a neutral forum, and treatment that is even-
handed and dignified. The importance of these procedural markers
can appear obvious, but decision-makers frequently lose sight of them
when faced with impending deadlines, potentially dire circum-
stances, and no guarantee that procedurally just procedures will pro-
duce cheerful consensus.
Adding mediation to the options already used on a regular basis
in investment treaty disputes has the potential to permit earlier reso-
lution of disputes, improve communication and information ex-
changes, enhance mutual understanding, encourage explicit
consideration of parties' interests as well as relevant rights, and pro-
duce integrative solutions and parties who understand that they par-
ticipated in a "justice event." This Article has made clear, however,
that the value of mediation and the particular model that is most
appropriate will depend upon the other processes available in the dis-
pute resolution system. The different names given to the processes-
i.e., "mediation" vs. "conciliation" vs. "arbitration"-will not be
enough to distinguish among them. It will be essential to dig more
deeply into the actual functions of the other processes that exist in
the dispute resolution system. Further, both dispute system design
principles and procedural justice theory and research urge that rep-
resentatives of investors and other affected stakeholders should be
involved in the decision-making process that produces the dispute
resolution system incorporated into the dispute resolution clauses in
treaties. Indeed, the input of such stakeholders should be sought re-
garding the addition of mediation to such a system, the model or mod-
els that will be used, appropriate referral mechanisms, and quality
controls.
Based on procedural justice research, this Article suggests that
the default mediation process should begin in a facilitative manner in
order to increase the likelihood of trust-building and information ex-
change. Such trust-building and information exchange is most likely
to yield information regarding disputing states' and investors' under-
lying interests and create the potential for the development of in-
tegrative solutions. At the same time, this model should only be
presumptive and should also permit both evaluative interventions by
the mediator and discussion of relevant legal norms. Thus, the pro-
cess itself will provide opportunity for the "loop forwards" and "loop
backs" recommended by dispute system design principles.
Particularly if stakeholders' input is sought and considered re-
garding mechanisms for the referral of disputes to mediation, proce-
dural justice research further suggests that mediation, or a more
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limited element of the process, could be made compulsory. As this
Article has detailed, courts in the U.S. have experimented with a
wide variety of options. The requirement of compulsory participation
in an initial meeting would permit the parties themselves to choose
whether to proceed further in mediation at that time or specify the
timing of its future use. The parties' engagement in such decision-
making would be consistent with both dispute system design princi-
ples and likely produce advantageous perceptions of procedural
justice.
Finally, this Article has introduced the variety of quality assur-
ance and accountability measures that may be undertaken if media-
tion is integrated into the investment treaty context. Such quality
assurance and accountability measures will be essential. In the short
term, the establishment of a small pool of well-known and well-
respected investment treaty mediators might offer a reasonably
strong and pragmatic guarantee of quality and engender a height-
ened perception of trust in the process. In the long term, evaluation
and mentoring should be put into place to permit thoughtful cultiva-
tion of both the model of mediation that is best suited for the inves-
tor-state context and the next generation of mediators.
The ultimate goal of investment treaty dispute resolution is to
foster foreign investment in a manner that is fair for investors seek-
ing profitable opportunities and for states working toward the com-
mon good of their people. Balanced appropriately, investors' and
states' interests should result in a mutually-reinforcing relationship.
Implemented in a manner consistent with dispute system design and
procedural justice, mediation may help investors and states remem-
ber why they were attracted to each other in the first place and
whether today's troubles simply signal the need to move to the next,
more realistic stage of their relationship. This is not as exciting, per-
haps, as the fireworks of a hard-fought arbitration, but fireworks are
costly and best saved for special occasions. With some well-timed and
well-executed help, the flame of mediation may cast a more modest
but more sustained light, to allow investors and states to join to-
gether in finding a path through the darkness.
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